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INTRODUCTION
This article explores whether administration of an effective truth
serum constitutes torture, particularly when used on an involuntary
subject to prevent an act of terrorism. In the aftermath of the
devastating terrorist attacks against U.S. targets on September 11,
2001,1 even a liberal columnist found himself announcing that it was
"time to think about torture."' Media reports abound with FBI, CIA,
and Justice Department investigators who expressed frustration with
the silence of terror suspects and considered more extreme methods,
including truth serum.3 Former director of the CIA and FBI, William
1. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE
9/11 COMM'N REPORT 1-14 (W.W. Norton & Company 2004) (describing the
hijacking of U.S. airplanes on September 11, 2001, the subsequent collapse of the
World Trade Center towers, the damage to the Pentagon, and the airline crash in
Pennsylvania).
2. See Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5,
2001, at 45 (describing the incident of September 11" as so horrifying that the U.S.
should consider using methods of interrogation formerly deemed unconscionable).
3. See, e.g., Ann Scott Tyson, US Task: Get Inside Head of Captured bin
Laden Aide, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2002, (noting former FBI
and CIA director William Webster indicated, and other experts agreed, that the
United States is justified in using sodium pentothal and other truth drugs but not
physical torture to prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0404/O1s03-uspo.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2005); see Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for
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Webster, urged the Pentagon "to administer truth serum drugs to
defiant Taliban and al-Qaida prisoners if needed to obtain
information that could save lives or prevent fresh terrorist attacks."4
It is unclear whether truth serum is an approved method in the
U.S. "war on terror, ' 5 but there are indications of abusive
interrogation.6 General James T. Hill, the general in charge of the
U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which holds suspected Al
Qaeda or Taliban detainees, stated that "the military didn't use
injections or chemicals on prisoners."7 General Hill additionally
claims that the Guantanamo Bay prison and its interrogation system
FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6 (stating former FBI counterterrorism
official's suggestion that the United States may reach a point when the use of drugs
during interrogation is acceptable but, at the same time, recognizing the difference
between the use of 'truth serum' and 'beating a guy till he is senseless'); see also
Daniel Jeffreys, Carnage in Queens: The Debate Dividing the US.... and a
Shocking Verdict on American Airline Safety From a Top Security Expert: Will
America now resort to torture?, DAILY MAIL (London), Nov. 13, 2001, at 16
(explaining the U.S. must decide whether torture and truth drugs should be used on
terror suspects).
4. See, e.g., Stewart M. Powell, Truth serum urged for detainees, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Apr. 28, 2002, at A16 (describing the pressure defense officials in the
U.S. would face to obtain information from detainees suspected of terrorism and
the belief that truth serum is a less intrusive method of obtaining information).
5. The United States is not the only state fighting a self-proclaimed "war on
terror." This article focuses on the United States because its war on terror is
distinct by virtue of the current status of the United States as the sole superpower.
Moreover, few if any other countries proclaim themselves to be the champion of
human rights and the rule of law as loudly or as frequently as the United States.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2003 (Feb. 25,
2004), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/200 4 / (last visited Apr. 2, 2005)
(noting annual reports criticizing human rights conditions in other countries). As a
result, a violation of the ban on torture is especially egregious when carried out by
the United States.
6. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States
Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?,
92 KY. L.J. 849, 873-98 (2003-2004) (discussing recent allegations of state-
sanctioned torture by the United States).
7. See Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Framework for Use of Torture,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at Al (assessing a draft report advising the degree of
pain or psychological manipulation that U.S. officials could use on detainees while
still being considered lawful). But see False Hopes, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003
(explaining the refusal of America's CIA and Pentagon to admit whether they use
truth serum).
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is a model and calls it humane8 despite extraordinary public criticism
from the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC").
Breaking its usual public silence on detention conditions, the ICRC
has released statements expressing concern over improper treatment
of so-called "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo Bay.9 Moreover,
allegations of torture have been made regarding prisoners at Abu
Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo
Bay.' Recent reports indicate that interrogators used torture, or at
8. See Richard Wittle, General: Guantdnamo Facility is Humane; As Some
Raise Abuse Concerns, He Says Center One to be Proud Of, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at A21 (noting General Hill's belief that they quickly detect
and punish any abuses occurring at Guantanamo); see also Powell, supra note 4, at
A16 (stating in April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld similarly
indicated that U.S. personnel would not use truth serum on high-profile terror
suspects). But see Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Mischaracterizes Findin-gs of 2 Studies
on U.S. Abuse at Iraqi Interrokations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at Al
(disclosing Rumsfeld's statement in August 2004 that investigations into abuse at
Abu Ghraib did not reveal abuse connected to interrogation). Rumsfeld later
corrected himself, stating that the investigation revealed "two or three" incidents of
abuse connected to interrogation or the interrogation process. Id. But, in fact, the
Fay report found that
in 16 of the 44 abuse cases the inquiry cited, military intelligence personnel
encouraged, condoned or solicited military police officers to commit abuses,
from using dogs to terrorize prisoners to placing detainees in dark, poorly
ventilated cells that were freezing cold or sweltering hot. In 11 other cases
they committed abuses themselves. Id.
As the numbers show, Rumsfeld significantly undercounted the number of cases
revealing abuse (two or three versus 27). See also Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details
Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at All
(detailing accounts of former intelligence officers and interrogators who describe
harsh tactics being used on an estimated one in six detainees).
9. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OPERATIONAL UPDATE, U.S.
DETENTION RELATED TO THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ITS AFTERMATH
- THE ROLE OF THE ICRC (2004) (maintaining that any detainees remaining in
Guantanamo Bay should either be charged, released, or, at the very least, have their
continued detention governed by the law), at
http://www.icrc.orgWeb/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/D8B5101EE13FCDD6C 125
6EDD004C58OF (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
10. See, e.g., Kate Zernile, Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern on
Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at Al (discussing military reports and
other documents that showed how abuse involved multiple service branches in
Guantanamo, Iraq and Afghanistan, beginning in 2002 and continuing after the
Abu Ghraib investigations began in the military and the U.S. Congress); see Scott
Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge; Abu Ghraib
Detainees' Statements Describe Sexual Humiliation and Savage Beatings, WASH.
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least inhumane treatment, as an interrogation tactic in the war on
terror.1" Interrogators used extreme tactics such as waterboarding, in
which "a detainee is strapped down, dunked under water and made to
believe that he might be drowned.' 2 Additionally, former detainees
reported that interrogators used unspecified drugs on them during
interrogations. 3
It remains unclear whether the most extreme tactics of physical
torture were part of an overall strategy within the current Bush
Administration. 4 It is clear, however, that high level officials in the
White House, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense
determined that abusive treatment was necessary and justified to win
the war on terror.'5 For example, then-White House Counsel Alberto
POST, May 21, 2004, at Al (describing the various allegations of abuse and photos
of mistreatment at Abu Ghraib); see also THE INDEP. PANEL TO REVIEW DEP'T OF
DEF. DET. OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEP. PANEL TO REVIEW DEP'T OF
DEF. DET. OPERATIONS, at 5-6 (Aug. 2004) (detailing the investigations into the
Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal and the Independent Panel's findings), at
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005);
ANTHONY R. JONES & GEORGE R. FAY, INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB, at 3-4 [hereinafter FAY REPORT] (finding it clear that
incidents of abuse occurred at Abu Ghraib), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fayjreport_8-25-
04.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
11. See discussion infra Parts II-IV (identifying the distinction between torture
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under the relevant
international treaty on torture).
12. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, C.I.A. Expands Its Inquiry Into
Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A10 (noting this as an
extreme technique used at secret facilities holding high-level Al-Qaeda suspects).
13. See Nancy Gibbs et al., Inside "The Wire, " Security breaches. Suicidal
detainees. A legal challenge heading to the Supreme Court. Welcome to
Guantanamo, TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, at 40 (explaining that a detainee who filed a
lawsuit for wrongful imprisonment against the United States said, "They would
give us these tablets that made us senseless").
14. See Jehl & Johnston, supra note 12, at A10 (questioning whether the
specific interrogation techniques used on Mr. Mohammed, the suspected
mastermind of September 11I ", were aggressive methods of interrogation
sanctioned by the government); see also Addicott, supra note 6, at 873-97
(discussing allegations of torture in the U.S. war on terror). Unless otherwise
noted, "Bush Administration" refers to the administration of President George W.
Bush, 2001-present.
15. See Jehl & Johnston, supra note 12, at A10 (noting both military and
intelligence officials expressed concern that investigations of Abu Ghraib prison,
as well as other detainment centers, damaged intelligence efforts and gave too
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Gonzales described some provisions of the Geneva Conventions as
"quaint" in light of the new kind of war on terror. 6 The Department
of Defense disseminated new interrogation procedures after
interrogators expressed frustration with the silence of war on terror
detainees. 7 Approved interrogation tactics included "stress and
duress" tactics banned under international law, such as prolonged
hooding, sleep-deprivation, painful physical postures, and menacing
by dogs.'8 The Department of Defense may have subsequently
disavowed some or all of the prohibited tactics, but this is still an
indication of the extreme measures being taken in the war on terror. 9
much deference to detainees).
16. See Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, to the President of the
United States, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Draft Memorandum] (referring specifically to the Geneva Convention's
requirements that captured enemies are entitled to such things as commissary
privileges, scrip, athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments), at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek (last visited Apr. 2, 2005);
see also Eric Lichtblau, The Cabinet Nominees: the Hearings: Gonzales Speaks
Against Torture During Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, January 7, 2005, at Al (reporting
Alberto Gonzales' statement that the Bush Administration has had "some very
preliminary discussion" about whether the Geneva Conventions should be revised).
17. See Dana Priest & Bradley Graham, U.S. Struggled Over How Far to Push
Tactics; Documents Show Back-and-Forth on Interrogation Policy, WASH. POST,
June 24, 2004, at Al (tracing the push for more leeway with interrogation back to
the military). The pressure to grant leeway occurred during Secretary Rumsfeld's
tenure as a result of the military's enhanced role in collecting and analyzing
information. Id. at Al.
18. See, e.g., Edwin Chen, Harsher Methods Fruitful, U.S. Says; Because of
the New Stance, a Terrorist Suspect Yielded Important Secrets About Al Qaeda,
Officials Say, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A19 (explaining Rumsfeld approved
the new tactics but later rescinded his directive after concerns regarding the
treatment of detainees surfaced); see Lisa Hajjar, Our Heart of Darkness,
AMNESTY Now, at 1 (2004) (discussing interrogation techniques employed by the
U.S. but banned by international law), available at
www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/darkness.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
19. See, e.g., David Johnston, Uncertainty About Interrogation Rules Seen as
Slowing the Hunt for Information on Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A8
(explaining that the status of suspension of extreme measures is unclear and the
rules for interrogation are under review but not necessarily rescinded); see Terence
Hunt et al., Bush Claimed Right to Waive Torture Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June
23, 2004 (stating the administration refused to explain which interrogation
methods the U.S. government has currently approved), at
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20040623/D83CFTFGO.html. (last visited Apr.
2, 2005).
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In addition, it appears that still-classified documents may condone
other tactics amounting to torture.2 °
Although the recently approved techniques do not appear to
include the use of truth serum, Amnesty International has expressed
its concern over "media reports suggesting that US security forces
may be considering using 'pressure techniques' including the 'truth
serum' Sodium Pentothal in order to elicit information from
detainees during interrogation. 21  Truth serum is considered
something less than torture.2 For example, Newsweek's Jonathan
Alter concluded that the United States could not legalize physical
torture-even in a "ticking bomb" scenario 2 3-because "it's contrary
to American values. '24 But truth serum was on the table, even
embraced as a less reprehensible tactic. 5 Alter stated: "Short of
physical torture, there's always sodium pentothal ('truth serum').
The FBI is eager to try it, and deserves the chance. 26
20. See discussion infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing
undisclosed memos).
21. See Memo from Amnesty Int'l, to the U.S. Attorney Gen., Amnesty
International's concerns relating to the post 11 September investigations, Al Index:
AMR 51/170/2001, at 16, § 9 (Nov. 1, 2001) (noting these techniques would
violate human rights treaties to which the United States is a party), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511702001 (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
22. See John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists:
Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PiTr. L. REv. 743, 768 n.59 (2002)
(indicating the administration of truth serum is probably significantly less harmful
than torture, although truth serum still constitutes a violation of privacy, dignity,
and bodily integrity).
23. See Daniel Rothenberg, "What We Have Seen Has Been Terrible" Public
Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror, 67 ALB. L.
REv. 465, 495 (2003) (describing a 'ticking bomb' scenario as a situation where a
bomb was, or will be, activated and the interrogators believe the suspect knows the
details regarding the bomb).
24. See Alter, supra note 2, at 45 (proposing people should keep an open mind
regarding certain tactics used to fight terrorism).
25. See Parry & White, supra note 22, at 768 n.59 (commenting on the use of
truth serum as less of a departure from American moral and constitutional norms
than the use of torture).
26. Alter, supra note 2, at 45; see also Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into
Discussion By News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at Cl (discussing an
interview where Alter stated that he supports the use of court-sanctioned sodium
pentothal on captive enemies, but not physical torture).
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More recently, others similarly concluded that physical torture is
prohibited, but the use of truth serum is not. 27 This conclusion is
flawed. The administration or threatened administration of truth
serum should be considered torture.2 s
Part I of this article examines the concept of "truth serum. 29 Part
II discusses the definition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment under the international Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("CAT") and the conditions of ratification attached to
CAT by the United States.3 In particular, Part II highlights the
reservation interpreting U.S. obligations regarding cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment and the U.S. understanding of the definition of
torture.3 Part III explores whether the ban on cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment prohibits the use of truth serum.32
27. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Criminal Defense in the Age of Terrorism:
Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 269-70 (2003/04) (arguing torture should be
viewed as presumptively unconstitutional but the use of truth serum is
distinguishable from torture). My approach differs from Professor Strauss' because
she concludes that the impact of international law such as CAT is "insignificant"
when dealing with U.S. tactics of interrogation. Id. at 251-52. See Jason R.
Odeshoo, Note, Truth or Dare?: Terrorism and "Truth Serum " in the Post-9/11
World, 56 STAN. L. REv. 209, 213 (2004) (speculating the lack of attention to
potential use of truth serum is based on the assumption that it is illegal, but
concluding it impossible to definitively declare that the torture convention
absolutely prohibits the use of truth serum).
28. Cf Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence and the
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong. 25-26 (1977) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (explaining the use of truth
serum in interrogation, however humane "as an alternative to physical torture, still
raises serious questions of individual rights and liberties"), at
http://www.geocities.com/essa-inc/senateintelhearing.txt (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
29. See discussion infra Part I (describing various attributes of truth serum and
its effects).
30. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and
accession by resolution of the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1984, 39 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June
26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT] (including both the U.S. ratification as well as the
original treaty from 1984).
31. See discussion infra Part II (focusing on the conditions attached to U.S.
ratification of CAT).
32. See discussion infra Part III (using the U.S. Constitution to establish a basis
[20:521
Is TRUTH SERUM TORTURE?
Part IV examines whether the ban on torture bars the use of truth
serum.33 Specifically, this section analyzes whether truth serum
causes severe pain or suffering and, if so, whether such pain is
intentionally inflicted as required under the treaty.34 Part IV draws on
U.S. interpretations, legislation, and case law, as well as
jurisprudence of the Committee Against Torture 35 and other
international bodies. Finally, Part V discusses the loophole in the
current understanding of torture and how to deal with it.36
The article determines that under the U.S. interpretation of mental
torture, the use or threatened use of truth serum causes severe mental
pain or suffering. 37 But mental pain or suffering alone is not
sufficient under CAT because interrogators must intentionally inflict
mental pain or suffering for certain purposes such as obtaining
information.38 With truth serum, the mental pain or suffering would
be a side effect of the drug-induced divulgence of information. As a
result, the administration of truth serum falls through a lacuna in
CAT's definition of torture.39 Oddly enough, the threatened
administration of truth serum does constitute torture because the
mental pain of a threat satisfies the intent requirement, but the side
effect of mental harm from the use of truth serum does not.40 The
contradictory conclusion-threats of truth serum are torture, but the
actual use is not-points to a problem with the current understanding
for the argument that truth serum constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment).
33. See discussion infra Part IV (concentrating on the specific requirements
used in defining torture).
34. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing severe pain or suffering under CAT
in light of U.S. interpretations).
35. See discussion infra note 101 (providing a brief description and explanation
of the Committee Against Torture, which is the monitoring body created by CAT).
36. See discussion infra Part V (offering two potential outcomes if the use, but
not the threat, of truth serum is not torture).
37. See discussion infra Conclusion (proposing the preferred outcome is to
adopt a new understanding of torture).
38. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (providing CAT's definition of the term
"torture").
39. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the loophole created in the U.S.
interpretation of CAT).
40. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (delineating what is required for torture).
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of torture under CAT.4 Given the incoherence and disadvantages of
the paradoxical conclusion, both the use and threat of truth serum
should be deemed unacceptable.42 The United States should rule out
the possibility of using truth serum on unwilling subjects, even as
part of the war on terror.43
I. WHAT IS TRUTH SERUM?
A. NEXT-GENERATION TRUTH SERUM
U.S. intelligence agents have long sought after truth serum." This
article posits the use of an effective, reliable serum that elicits what
the subject actually believes to be the truth. Outsiders cannot prove
its existence because of the "I'd tell you but then I'd have to kill
41. See discussion infra Part V (offering a new understanding of torture that
would eliminate the loophole created by the U.S. interpretation of CAT).
42. See id. (explaining that the United States must take a stand against the use
of truth serum as it constitutes torture).
43. For other arguments against the use of torture, see generally Oren Gross,
Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official
Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1489 (2004) (arguing for an absolute
prohibition on torture); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw:
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278, 324-25 (2003) (conceding an American official may believe that torture as a
matter of morality and public policy, in the face of an event like 9/11, is the lesser
evil but, at the same time, insisting that the U.S. Constitution prohibits these
actions); Strauss, supra note 27, at 253-68 (discussing policy arguments such as
the ineffectiveness of torture and the use of torture presenting a "slippery slope").
But see, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 156-63 (2002)
(advocating for the use of torture warrants). Torture is not only immoral, it is
ineffective, as explained, for example, by Senator John McCain, former POW in
Vietnam, who has stated that torture does not work because victims are apt to say
what the torturers want to hear. See, e.g., Nick Coleman, For the U.S., torture
seemed in the past, STAR-TRIB. (St. Paul, Minn.), May 12, 2004, at 20B (noting the
impact that this effect will have on U.S. interrogation methods). Its overbroad use
may create more terrorists. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 27, at 253-68 (indicating
the difficulty, or even impossibility, of strictly limiting the use of torture to specific
circumstances and adding that society suffers from torture because when a
government implements torture, it reduces the moral difference between a
governmental act and a criminal act).
44. See Martin A. Lee, Truth Serums & Torture, CONSORTIuM NEWS
(Arlington, VA) June 4, 2002 (explaining agents have desired this since at least
1942 when the CIA asked scientists to develop a substance that could be used on
enemy spies and POWs), at http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0499.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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you" problem. Anyone with actual knowledge of the government's
efforts to create or obtain such a substance cannot reveal it because
any military or other government projects related to truth serum
would be classified.45 It is uncertain that such a substance exists, but
it is plausible to believe that the U.S. government is continuing to
search for a truth serum that lives up to its name.
The currently acknowledged substances commonly referred to as
truth serum--e.g., Sodium Pentothal-do not force the subject to tell
the truth, but rather, merely make the subject more talkative.46
Lowering inhibitions, however, does not guarantee that elicited
information will be accurate. 47 This alone is a potent argument to ban
its use.48 Simply put, truth serum as it is publicly known to date does
not work.4 9 But what if there is a truth serum that lives up to its
name? A drug with no negative physical side effects beyond a prick
of the needle,50 a next-generation Sodium Pentothal that actually
induced truth telling? If our government were to possess such a
45. See, e.g., Scott Martelle, The Truth About Truth Serum: It may make for
loose lips but not necessarily elicit honest answers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2001, Part
5, at I (noting the remarks of a clinical psychiatry and behavioral sciences
professor from USC who claimed that "[n]othing [evidencing truth serum] exists in
the research literature. Whether some secret CIA lab has something, I have no idea.
They don't share with me their pharmacological stuff').
46. See id. at 1 (stating "details that might come tumbling out [after so-called
truth serum injection] would be as suspect as the ramblings of the drunk on the
next bar stool").
47. See id. at 1 (reiterating individuals without inhibitions are not necessarily
truthful).
48. Cf Strauss, supra note 27, at 264 (suggesting empirical research is needed
to determine the likelihood that truth serum sessions would produce false
information that would set back an investigation). Otherwise, valuable time might
be spent using an ineffective, unreliable tool, and inaccurate information could lead
to futile expenditures of precious resources chasing down erroneous leads. Id.
49. See Jessica Pae, Note, The Emasculation of Compelled Testimony: Battling
the Effects of Judicially Imposed Limitations on Grand Jury Investigations of
Terrorism and Other Ideological Crimes, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 473, 504-05 (1997)
(arguing that information obtained after using truth serum is at best unreliable); see
also Anupama Katakam, The Truth Serum Trial, FRONTLINE, Mar. 12, 2004
(reporting although truth serum used on a suspect by Indian authorities yielded
information, there are doubts about its credibility).
50. But see Pae, supra note 49 at 503 (contending that currently, "truth serum"
injections may involve intrusive medical procedures involving serious health
risks).
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substance, should it use it in our name? This article concludes that it
should not.5
A CIA report explains that "[a]ny technique that promises an
increment of success in extracting information from an uncompliant
source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations."52 In fact,
the CIA previously experimented with truth serums and other drugs
within the United States, sometimes without the knowledge of the
subjects.53 Project MKULTRA, for example, was a CIA project from
1953-1964 that provided funds for research on drugs and behavioral
modification.14  At least one "unwitting" test subject who
unknowingly ingested LSD died as a result of the experiments.5
Although the CIA stated that such experiments ceased in 1977,56
similar past assurances were false. For example, the CIA supposedly
ended project ARTICHOKE, which included experiments with
Sodium Pentothal, but "evidence suggests that Office of Security and
Office of Medical Services use of 'special interrogation' techniques
continued for several years thereafter. ' 57 Moreover, the true extent of
the CIA's MKULTRA experiments on unwitting human subjects is
unknown because the then-Director of Central Intelligence ordered
51. See discussion infra Conclusion (concluding democratic states, mainly the
United States, should not resort to torture, including the use of truth serum).
52. See Joint Hearing, supra note 28, at 2 (opening remarks of Sen. Inouye)
(describing experiments by intelligence operatives using drugs to acquire
information from subjects).
53. See, e.g., Jason R. Odeshoo, Truth or Dare?: Terrorism & Truth Serum in
the Post-9/11 World, 57 STAN. L. REv. 209, 216-21 (2004) (giving a brief history
of truth serum and describing U.S. efforts to obtain it from World War II to the
1960s).
54. See id. at 220-21 (stating the program's goal was to develop chemical and
biological agents to control human behavior).
55. See Joint Hearing, supra note 28, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(illustrating the subjects were seldom accessible to speak with during the tests and
often became ill for days).
56. See id. at 8-10 (statement of Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral
Stansfield Turner) (discussing the elusive behavior of the CIA during this time
period and the sparse information it distributed regarding these tests and projects).
57. See id. at 68 (mentioning participants in ARTICHOKE met monthly to
discuss the project, but project information past the fall of 1953 is scarce).
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all records to be destroyed in 1973. 58
B. PREVENTIVE INTERROGATIONAL TRUTH SERUM
As discussed in the Introduction, the Bush Administration seems
to believe that the war on terror justifies the use of previously
unacceptable (or at least unnecessary) interrogation techniques on
suspected terrorists.59 If an effective truth serum exists or is
developed in the near future, it will be used in the name of
preventing another 9/11. Consider the following situation: U.S.
officials (whether state or federal law enforcement, military, or
intelligence) detain an individual suspected to have information
regarding an imminent terrorist attack. Under interrogation, the
individual refuses to provide any pertinent information. The officials
administer truth serum, which does not cause any physical harm
beyond the prick of the needle. The subject responds to subsequent
questions by providing truthful answers or, in other words, he states
what he believes to be the truth. The drug makes it impossible for the
subject to provide false information. For example, if the interrogators
ask him the names, location, or contact information of other
members of his organization, he will give the information that he
believes to be accurate---even if he had previously refused to do so.
If the interrogators ask him whether he is committing a crime, he will
likely respond that he is not because in his mind, the terrorist group
is engaged in "freedom-fighting," a jihad, or a crusade, not criminal
activity. With careful questioning, however, skilled interrogators can
obtain the concrete information necessary to thwart a terrorist act,
provided the suspect has knowledge of the plan.
This scenario falls under "preventive interrogational torture"--
"torture whose aim is to gain information that would assist
authorities in foiling exceptionally grave terrorist attacks."'6 Thus,
58. See id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting when the records were
destroyed in 1973, a few files were inadvertently missed; in response to a
subsequent Freedom of Information Act request, remnants of the records were
located in the budget section of CIA archives). Thus, the 1977 hearing was held in
response to the later discovery. Id.
59. See discussion supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (suggesting the
Administration believes that some form of torture may be necessary in the post-
9/11 world).
60. See Gross, supra note 43, at 1487-88 (arguing an absolute ban on torture,
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this article will refer to it as "preventive interrogational truth serum."
Although the current targets of the war on terror are Al Qaeda and
related Islamist terrorist groups,61 this article's examination applies to
any terrorist group, from religious fanatic to white supremacist to
"ecoterrorist. ' 62
The analysis will show that preventive interrogational use of truth
serum would cause severe mental pain or suffering based on the U.S.
government's own reading of CAT.63 It would not technically be
torture, however, because the use of truth serum would not meet
other requirements of the stringent definition of torture under CAT.64
Strangely enough, the threat of truth serum would constitute torture
under CAT as ratified by the United States. 65
II. WHAT IS TORTURE?
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW
This article focuses on international law, where the definition of
torture is most developed and where the prohibition against torture is
the strongest. In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
with extralegal use of torture in extraordinary cases, is superior to the use of torture
warrants).
61. See Aliya Haider, The Rhetoric of Resistance: Islamism, Modernity, &
Globalization, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 91-92 (2002) (referring to Islamist
groups, like the Taliban, as radical groups who advocate the destruction of
international normalcy).
62. By terrorism, I refer to acts of violence aimed at instilling fear and/or
destroying vital political/economic targets or critical infrastructure. While there is
no generally accepted definition of terrorism, this definition would encompass
groups currently targeted in the war on terror as well as similar groups. For
purposes of this discussion, the label of terrorist is effectively imposed by the U.S.
government and whether the label "terrorist" is currently overused in the war on
terror is irrelevant to this inquiry and beyond the scope of this article.
63. See discussion infra Part IV.A (analyzing the definition of severe mental
pain or suffering under CAT, including the U.S. conditions).
64. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the requirement in CAT that the
intentional infliction of torturous acts must be for a certain purpose).
65. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining why the threat of using truth
serum falls within the U.S. definition of torture).
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Treatment or Punishment ("the Declaration against Torture").66 In
1984, the General Assembly adopted the international Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment by consensus.67 The language of the resolution
indicated CAT codified an already "existing prohibition under
international law."68 The ban on official torture is customary
international law. 69 Furthermore, it has risen to the level of a jus
cogens norm binding on all states.70
CAT "has now become the benchmark reference"71 for torture,
although many other treaties also ban torture. Additional
international documents covering torture and cruel, inhuman or
66. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-9 (2nd ed. 1999) (summarizing the history of torture,
including U.N. adoption of the Declaration against Torture).
67. See CAT, supra note 30, at pmbl. (setting forth CAT's goals and noting the
signing members agreed upon them); see also RODLEY, supra note 66, at 20-32
(discussing the various resolutions and working group activity between the
Declaration against Torture and CAT in greater detail); J. HERMAN BURGERS &
HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A
HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, 13-18, 32-99 (1988)
(detailing the development of CAT and the working group discussions and reports
from 1979-1984).
68. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at 65 (noting although the prohibition against
torture existed, the need for effective means of enforcement sparked the creation of
CAT); see also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 3 (1990) ("The Convention codifies
international law as it has evolved, particularly in the 1970's, on the subject of
torture .... 7).
69. See BETH STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 257 (1996) (indicating the universal practice of condemning torture, but
also remarking that many governments continue to tolerate torture despite these
norms).
70. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 12 (stating the prohibition
against torture is a universally valid rule that can be considered a peremptory norm
as defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); see
also Kreimer, supra note 43, at 316 (asserting despite the conventions which guard
against torture, it evolved into a jus cogens norm due to "fundamental moral
perceptions of the international community").
71. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at 47 (establishing 105 states ratified or
acceded to CAT, which also may be considered to apply to all states under general
international law).
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degrading treatment include: Geneva Conventions; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Regional treaties include: the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; and the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.72 The Rome
Statute of the recently created International Criminal Court prohibits
torture as a crime against humanity and a war crime.73
Despite these other treaties, the primary source of U.S. obligations
is CAT.74 Thus, this article assesses the use of preventive
interrogational truth serum under CAT, as ratified by the United
States.75 Torture is defined in Article 1 of CAT as follows:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
72. See id. at 55-57 (providing a brief description of other treaties poised to
combat torture); see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 11-12(presenting a similar history of such treaties); AMNESTY INT'L, COMBATING
TORTURE: A MANUAL FOR ACTION, at ch. 1 (2003) (summarizing the evolution in
the fight against torture), available at(http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engACT400012003) (last visited Apr. 2,
2005); Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under International Law, 67
ALB. L. REv. 427, 431-34 (2003) (outlining the Torture Convention); see generally
Odeshoo, supra note 27 (discussing whether the use of truth serum violates various
treaties).
73. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(8) &
8(2)(ii), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) (entered into
force July 1, 2002) (citing torture as prohibited), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjoumaRomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
74. See Dep't of Def., Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and
Operational Considerations, II.B (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter DOD Working Group
Memo] ("The United States' primary obligation concerning torture derives from
[CAT]."), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjlD=OShrzgi8q7&Content=-385 (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
75. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the use of preventive interrogational
truth serum as a potential violation of CAT as modified by the United States upon
ratification).
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him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.
76
CAT also requires states parties to "undertake to prevent in any
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in article 1 . . . ."I Moreover, Article 2 provides: "No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."78
B. U.S. RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
The United States ratified CAT in October 1994; the treaty came
into force the following month.7 9 As an international treaty ratified
by the United States, CAT is part of the supreme law of the land
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.80 However, the
United States attached conditions to its ratification. 81 Thus this article
first discusses the U.S. conditions, known as Reservations,
76. CAT, supra note 30, art. 1.
77. Id., art. 16.
78. Id., art. 2(2).
79. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, TREATY
AFFAIRS, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS
OF THE U.S. IN FORCE AS OF JAN. 1, 2000, 472 (2000), at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal-affairs/tifindex.html.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution, laws made
pursuant to the Constitution, "and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
81. See U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs] (establishing those
reservations that modify the CAT).
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Understandings and Declarations ("RUDs").82 After briefly assessing
the validity and content of the RUDs, the article examines relevant
U.S. legislation that partially implements CAT.83 The CAT
definition, the U.S. conditions on ratification, and the interpretations
of torture in U.S. legislation combine to establish the parameters of
U.S. commitments regarding CAT.' Part IV analyzes the U.S.
commitments regarding "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," while Part V examines the U.S. obligations regarding
torture. Both parts focus on preventive interrogational truth serum in
the context of the U.S. war on terror.
1. U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
The United States interpreted the provisions of CAT through its
package of RUDs.85 A reservation is a condition that purports to
"exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State ... ."86 A reservation is valid
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties so long as it is
not "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty" unless
otherwise indicated in the treaty itself.8 7 CAT does not contain a
general provision addressing the validity of reservations, although it
does specify that states may reserve the right to opt out of its
systematic investigation procedure.88 An understanding purports to
82. See discussion infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (conveying the
U.S. understandings of CAT within the RUDs).
83. See discussion infra Part II.C (examining statutes relevant to torture).
84. See DOD Working Group Memo, supra note 74, II.B (explaining the U.S.
position on CAT includes a modification of the terms and concepts of "torture,"
"substantial grounds" for believing a person will face torture, "degrading
treatment," and an understanding that implementation measures for these
provisions already existed, thus fulfilling the CAT requirement for parties to take
legislative measures to carry out the terms of this treaty).
85. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81 (stating conditions on U.S. ratification of
CAT).
86. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 333, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
87. See id., art. 19 (articulating reservations may be attached to ratification
unless that reservation is not allowed by the treaty, or is incompatible with the
"object and purpose of the treaty").
88. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 28 (providing a state may declare that it does
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offer the state's interpretation of the treaty provision(s) without
modifying obligations under the treaty. A statement labeled an
"understanding" or "declaration" may be considered a reservation if
it modifies or excludes the effect of the treaty.
89
The first U.S. reservation equates "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" ("CIDT") in Article 16 of CAT with the
U.S. Constitution's "cruel and unusual punishment" ban.90 The first
understanding to Article 1's definition of torture includes (1) an
interpretation of "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental"; (2) a limitation of torture to acts in custody or control; (3)
an interpretation of "lawful sanctions"; (4) a definition of
"acquiescence" of an official; and (5) an exclusion of violations of
legal procedural standards from the definition of torture.91 Four
additional understandings interpret other articles of the treaty that are
irrelevant to this article.92
The first section of the understanding to Article 1, interpreting
"severe pain or suffering," is particularly significant here. This
understanding can be broken down into two parts.
[First,] in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and [second] that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another
person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances
not recognize the competence of the committee under Article 20 and may
withdraw this reservation at any time).
89. See id. (describing the label of reservation as applicable to any unilateral
statement no matter the wording).
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
91. U.S. RUDs supra note 81, at II(1)(b)-(e). The second reservation limits
referrals to the International Court of Justice. Id. at 1(2).
92. See id. at 1I.(2)-(4) (interpreting Article 3 regarding substantial grounds for
finding a person would be subject to torture if returned to a country; interpreting
Article 14 regarding private right of action; affirming the death penalty; and
interpreting obligations under Articles 10-14 and 16 in light of the federal system).
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or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality. 9
3
Before evaluation, it must be determined whether the reservation
regarding Article 16 (CIDT) and the understanding to Article 1
(torture) are proper conditions to the U.S. ratification of CAT.94
2. Validity of U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
The first reservation (to Article 16 CIDT) and the first U.S.
understanding (to Article 1 torture) are of questionable validity.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that they wholly violate the object
and purpose of the treaty.95 It could be argued that the first U.S.
understanding is actually a reservation, because it purports to modify
or exclude the effect of the treaty, specifically, by changing the
definition of torture.96 Although labeled an understanding, it could be
contested that it actually attempts to limit the definition by its
requirement of specific intent, prerequisites for mental pain or
suffering, and interpretation of acquiescence.97  Indeed, the
Netherlands criticized this U.S. understanding on the ground that it
"appears to restrict the scope of the definition of torture under article
1 of the Convention. '98
93. Id. at Understanding 1(a).
94. See id. at I(1), II(1)(a) (reserving "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" as equivalent to the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment clause and interpreting "severe pain or suffering").
95. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86, art. 19(c),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 337 (asserting states cannot form a reservation incompatible
with the "object and purpose" of the treaty).
96. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at 1(1 )(a) (establishing an understanding of
the interpretation of mental harm and specific intent).
97. See id. at II(1)(a)-(e) (providing an understanding of various terms in the
CAT definition of torture).
98. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment: Declarations and Reservations to CAT, adopted and
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly Dec. 19, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984) [hereinafter Objections to CAT] (Objection of the Netherlands)
(considering the U.S. understanding to have no impact on the obligations of the
U.S. under CAT), at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-reserve.htm (last visited
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The United States countered that the first understanding is not a
reservation and is not in conflict with the definition of torture in
CAT.99 The United States contended that there is no inconsistency
between Article 1 and the specific intent or mental harm aspects of
the first U.S. understanding. 00 The United States explained in its
testimony before the Committee Against Torture' 0 that the
understanding "did not modify the meaning of article 1, but rather
clarified it, adding the precision required by the U.S. domestic
law."'1
02
Members of the Committee Against Torture have considered the
U.S. RUDs. While discussing the U.S. report, one member of the
Committee expressed concern regarding the first understanding as
well as the reservation to Article 16 (CIDT). 03 A different member,
Apr. 2, 2005).
99. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19
of the Convention: Initial Report of the United States of America, Comm. Against
Torture, 24th Sess., Summary Record of the First Part of the 427th mtg. 6,
CAT/C/SR.427 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. Report to Committee Against Torture]
(statement of Mr. Yeomans-USA) (defending the U.S. decision to "clarify"
Article 1 of CAT with the inclusion of a specific intent requirement), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CAT.C.SR.427.En?Opendocument
(last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
100. See id. (maintaining the distinction that a specific intent requirement serves
as a clarification and not a change in meaning of the definition of torture).
101. See CAT, supra note 30 (establishing a monitoring body, the Committee
Against Torture, in Article 17, that considers reports submitted periodically by
states parties (Article 19), inquires into systematic practice of torture within states
parties (Article 20), and considers interstate (Article 21) and individual (Article 22)
complaints of treaty violations). The United States has chosen not to join the
individual complaint procedure and no interstate complaints or inquiries have been
lodged against the United States. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81. But it did submit
its report to the Committee on October 15, 1999. See U.S. Report to Committee
Against Torture, supra note 99, 18.
102. See U.S. Report to Committee Against Torture, supra note 99, 6
(statement of Mr. Yeomans-USA) (contending that any clarifications in U.S.
ratification of CAT would not affect its obligations, only how the U.S. would apply
these articles in domestic law).
103. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19
of the Convention: Initial Report of the United States of America, Comm. Against
Torture, 24th Sess., Summary Record of the First Part of the 424th mtg. 33,
CAT/C/SR.424 (2000) [hereinafter Committee Consideration of U.S. Report]
(statement of Mr. Silva Henriques Gaspar) (questioning validity of U.S. RUDs),
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Mr. Camara, criticized only the Article 16 reservation."° Committee
member Camara remarked that CAT allowed reservations only under
Article 28 (opting out of Article 20, which provides for Committee
investigations of systematic torture); thus, the U.S. reservation to
Article 16 is inadmissible."°5 In response to the criticism, the United
States noted that CAT, by its terms, does not rule out reservations to
other provisions. In addition, it noted that no state had adopted the
position of Committee member Camara. 1°6
In fact, three countries objected to the U.S. reservation to Article
16 (CIDT) on various grounds: Finland (finding the general
reference to national law insufficient because it casts doubt on the
U.S. commitment to CAT), the Netherlands (considering the U.S.
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of CAT and
explaining that it is unclear how the U.S. Constitution will relate to
the Convention's obligations), and Sweden (referring to a similar
objection Sweden made to the U.S. reservations to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where Sweden found that the
U.S. reservations limited its responsibilities under the Covenant and,
therefore, were incompatible with the Covenant's object and
purpose). 107 In the end, however, the Committee as a whole
available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CAT.C.SR.424.En?Opendocument
(last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
104. See id. at 31 (arguing that the U.S. reservation is unacceptable).
105. See id. (contending that the U.S. reservation is invalid).
106. See U.S. Report to Committee Against Torture, supra note 99, 33 (Mr.
Koh of U.S. delegation) (defending U.S. reservations); see also Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong.
100-20 (1990) (statement of David Forte, Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall
College of Law) (arguing CAT intended to be open to reservations, while states are
left to find a definition of torture focused on criminal aspects of the act, either
through reservations or legislation).
107. See Objections to CAT, supra note 98 (Objections of Finland, the
Netherlands, and Sweden) (detailing these countries' objections to the U.S. RUDs
to CAT); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Declarations and Reservations, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (Objection of Sweden) (containing the text of Sweden's
objection later incorporated into its Objections to CAT), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4_l.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
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commented on the reservation to Article 16, but not the interpretative
understanding of Article 1.108 With regard to Article 16, the
Committee expressed concern that the reservation's effect would be
"to limit the application of the Convention."'' 9 As a result, the
Committee recommended that the United States withdraw its
reservations and understandings to CAT." ° Nonetheless, the
Committee did not specifically condemn the U.S. reservations or
understandings in its response to the U.S. report, nor has it done so in
other general comments."'
By contrast, other United Nations committees that monitor human
rights have determined that U.S. RUDs to other treaties are invalid.
For example, the Human Rights Committee considered reservations
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") in its General Comment 24.112 Without mentioning any
108. See Civil and Political Rights Including the Questions of Torture and
Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR 57th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 11 (a), 1265, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66 (2001) (noting the Special
Rapporteur's non-binding opinion that the U.S. constitutional standard for cruel
and unusual punishment "falls short of the prohibition under general international
law" of CIDT and that CIDT is binding on the United States "regardless of the
State's reservation to article 16"), available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/e-cn4-2001-
66.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
109. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess.,
Concluding Observations & Comments: United States of America, 179, U.N.
Doc. A/55/44 (2000) (expressing numerous concerns regarding U.S. obligations
under CAT), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/usdocs/torturecomments.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
110. See id. 180 (recommending as well that the United States "enact a federal
crime of torture in terms consistent" with the Convention).
111. See id. (listing the Committee's concerns over the U.S. declarations and
reservations but only offering recommendations as opposed to an outright
condemnation).
112. See General Comment 24 (52): General Comment on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to Covenant or the Optional
Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C21/rev.1/Add.6 (1994)
[hereinafter General Comment 24] (describing the Committee's position with
regard to the application of international law principles to the making of
reservations), available at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom24.htm#one (last visited Apr. 2,
2005); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and
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states parties, it described reservations that are incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty-several of which are aimed at U.S.
RUDs to the ICCPR."3 Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee
determined that incompatible reservations are void and took the
controversial step of deciding that the invalid reservations are
severable. 114 Thus, under the Human Rights Committee's approach,
the reserving country remains a state party to the treaty even if it
would never have ratified the ICCPR without the severed
reservations. In addition, the Human Rights Committee specifically
condemned a U.S. reservation regarding the death penalty in
response to the U.S. report to that committee regarding compliance
with the ICCPR. 15
The Committee Against Torture, however, chose not to follow this
model, instead merely recommending withdrawal of RUDs. Thus, it
appears that neither the reservation to Article 16 (CIDT) nor the
understanding to Article 1 (torture) is a clear violation of the object
and purpose of CAT. 16 Moreover, because this article focuses on the
U.S. war on terror, the analysis will accept the U.S. RUDs as
clarifications of the U.S. obligations under CAT.I 7
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(another human rights treaty, which the United States ratified with a package of
RUDs).
113. See General Comment 24, supra note 112, 8 (determining that a state may
not reserve the right to violate peremptory norms, for example, by reserving the
right to torture or to execute children).
114. See id. 18 ("such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense
that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the
reservation.").
115. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United
States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, 279, A/50/40 (1995)
(concluding a reservation regarding the death penalty, maintaining a right to
impose the death penalty on juveniles and otherwise expanding the scope of death-
eligible crimes is incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/hrcuscomments.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
116. See id. (explaining reservations found to violate the object and purpose of
CAT will be considered void and will not be in effect for the reserving party).
117. See Letter of William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Dep't of
Defense, to Senator Patrick Leahy (June 25, 2003), in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, COMM. ON MILITARY
AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED
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C. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW ON TORTURE
The United States has repeatedly taken a strong rhetorical stance
against the use of torture or CIDT. In its report to the Committee
Against Torture, the United States proclaimed:
Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is
categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state
authority. Every act constituting torture under the Convention constitutes
a criminal offence under the law of the United States. No official of the
Government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized to
commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official
condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances
may be invoked as a justification of torture. United States law contains no
provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be employed on
grounds of exigent circumstances (for example, during a "state of public
emergency") or on orders from a superior officer or public authority, and
the protective mechanisms of an independent judiciary are not subject to
suspension. The United States is committed to the full and effective
implementation of its obligations under the Convention throughout its
territory. 1
18
Despite this sweeping pronouncement, the United States has taken
only limited steps to implement its commitments under CAT. First,
the initial declaration to CAT deems the treaty to be non-self-
executing, as is typical for U.S. ratification of human rights
treaties. 19 As a result, victims of torture cannot bring a cause of
action under CAT. Second, the United States has foreclosed the
remedy of petitioning the Committee Against Torture by refusing to
opt into CAT's individual complaint procedure. 2 ' The United States
STATES' INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES app. A (indicating the obligation to
conduct interrogations in "a manner that is consistent with [CAT] as ratified by the
United States in 1994"), available at
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/HIUMANRIGHTS.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
118. See U.S. Report to Committee Against Torture, supra note 99, 6
(affirming the U.S. stance against torture).
119. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Declaration 1 ("declar[ing] that the
provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing" in the
United States).
120. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 22 (providing a "State Party to this
Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on
behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
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did opt in to the interstate procedure under Article 21, but this
mechanism is rarely if ever used in human rights treaties. 12 1 Third,
civil remedies are limited. Recourse for victims of torture abroad is
available in the form of civil suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(aliens only) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (torture under
"foreign authority" only). 22 Fourth, despite ratification of CAT,
there is no single federal crime of torture broad enough to fully
implement CAT. 23
Rather, U.S. legislation takes a piecemeal approach to torture. The
United States "considered existing law to be adequate to its
obligations under the Convention and determined that it would not be
appropriate to establish a new federal cause of action, or to
'federalize' existing state protections, through adoption of omnibus
violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention") (emphasis added).
"No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party
which has not made such a declaration." Id.
121. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Declaration 2 (recognizing the
competence of CAT "to receive and consider communications to the effect that a
State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations" under
Article 21 of the Convention); see also CAT, supra note 30, art. 21 (outlining the
procedure to be followed when a State Party believes that another State Party is not
fulfilling the terms of the Convention). The procedure calls for a lengthy process
including attempts at friendly settlement and conciliation. Id. The state may refer
the matter to the Committee Against Torture after six months of attempted friendly
settlement. Id. The Committee then has one year to issue a report, with a solution if
possible. Id. Committee meetings considering the matter are confidential. Id.
122. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (stating that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"); see
also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding torture
constitutes a violation of the law of nations for purposes of the alien tort statute);
Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) (allowing U.S. citizens and
aliens to seek damages for torture or extrajudicial killings but limiting its
jurisdiction to acts committed by those acting under the authority of foreign
nations). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, 281 (1999)
[hereinafter INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES] (highlighting the differences
between both statutes in regard to jurisdiction), at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/cat/usa2000.html.
123. See INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 122, 178
(admitting that no federal statute "specifically defines or prohibits torture or
directly implements the central provisions of this Convention").
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implementing legislation.1114 Congress did, however, pass legislation
criminalizing acts of torture outside the United States. United States
Criminal Code, Section 2340 et seq. criminalizes acts of torture
committed outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction by a U.S. national or
by an alleged offender who is present in the United States.12 To date,
no cases have been brought under this statute. 26 Despite its lack of
use, this legislation is still relevant as "Section 2340's definition of
torture track[s] the definition set forth in CAT, as elucidated by the
United States' [RUDs] submitted as part of its ratification."' 127 In
"124. Id. 60.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994) (listing several definitions for terms utilized
throughout the statute); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (extending the statute's reach
to cover both U.S. nationals and non-U.S. nationals found in the United States,
who commit torture abroad); 18 U.S.C. § 2340B ("Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as precluding the application of State or local laws on the same subject,
nor shall anything in this chapter be construed as creating any substantive or
procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any civil proceeding.").
126. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS, at CRS-13
(2004) [hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS] (revealing CRS did not
encounter even one case where the Department of Justice relied on 18 U.S.C. §
2340), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/3 6 230.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005). Other statutes might be used in cases involving mistreatment
of detainees. Id. For example, a recent prosecution of a military contractor in
Afghanistan accused in the death of an Afghan prisoner is based on 18 U.S.C. §
113 (2004), assaults within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. See Indictment, United States v. Passaro (E.D.N.C. 2004) (No. 5:04-
CR-2 11-1) (charging CIA contractor with criminal assault of an Afghan prisoner
detained by U.S. military personnel at U.S. army base in Afghanistan, who died
while in custody), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/uspassaro617O4ind.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005). Several commentators have called for prosecution of those U.S.
citizens allegedly responsible for torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Holtzman, Bush has a lot to answer for on Iraq Torture, NEWSDAY, June
16, 2004 (suggesting torture statute should be utilized in connection with Abu
Ghraib), at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/10/4895# (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005); see Marjorie Cohn, War Crimes, Truthout-Perspective,
May 13, 2004 (same), at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-
bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/9/4445 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
127. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel: Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, at 12-13 (August 1, 2002)
[hereinafter OLC Memo], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
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addition to Section 2340, immigration regulations have been adopted
to implement CAT provisions related to nonrefoulement (non-return)
of persons to countries where they would be subjected to torture.128
Thus, U.S. law is still lacking in terms of direct enforcement of
CAT. 29 Federal criminal legislation covers acts of torture abroad,
leaving ordinary criminal law to cover other acts of torture. 130
Additionally, civil remedies under U.S. law also focus on torture
abroad. 13
Despite limited avenues of redress for torture by or within the
United States, it is still crucial to determine whether the United
States commits torture in order to mobilize shame over U.S. actions.
In the arena of international human rights, norm enunciation and
deterrence are often as important as an enforceable result.132 In the
context of a private cause of action for torture, for example, even
unenforceable declaratory or default judgments are significant. 13
They announce to the world that an important norm has been
violated and may empower the plaintiff "by creating a bargaining
chip for use in other political fora.' 34 Similarly, a determination that
128. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 126, at CRS-7-8 (providing
the Department of Homeland Security's estimates that in the first four years of
implementing CAT Article 3 regulations to immigration proceedings,
"approximately 1,700 aliens were granted deferral or withholding of removal based
on CAT protections").
129. See discussion supra note 123 and accompanying text (stating no U.S.
statute directly implements CAT provisions).
130. See discussion supra note 125 and accompanying text (revealing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A only reaches individuals who commit torture abroad).
131. See discussion supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining federal
civil remedies are only available to victims of torture committed abroad).
132. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347, 2349 (1991) (arguing in traditional international law litigation, plaintiffs
pursue prospective aims in addition to their own personal compensation and
redress).
133. See id. at n.11 (declaring although uncollected judgments fail to
compensate victims, they can serve other purposes such as the deterrence of future
similar conduct, the denial of safe haven to violators, and the "enunciation of legal
norms opposing the conduct for which the defendant was found liable").
134. See id. at 2349 (contrasting the "dualist" views of international
jurisprudence, which view international law as binding upon nations in their
relations with one another, with transnational litigation, which allows individual
plaintiffs to claim rights directly).
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the use or threatened use of effective truth serum constitutes torture
might serve as a moral denunciation, possibly deterring future
practice. Thus, in order to mobilize shame and moral outrage against
the hostile use of truth serum, it is necessary to analyze it under CAT
as the United States has ratified it.
135
D. U.S. LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TORTURE
In examining U.S. obligations under CAT, this article draws on
several legal memos that became public after the release of appalling
photos of abuse from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 136 The memos were
first leaked to the Washington Post and described as follows:
The [August 1, 2002, Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel for
Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to President Bush] memo was written at the
request of the CIA .... The White House asked the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel for its legal opinion on the standards of conduct
under [CAT]. The Office of Legal Counsel is the federal government's
ultimate legal adviser. The most significant and sensitive topics that the
federal government considers are often given to the OLC for review. In
this case, the memorandum was signed by Jay S. Bybee, the head of the
office at the time. Bybee's signature gives the document additional
authority, making it akin to a binding legal opinion on government policy
on interrogations. Bybee has since become a judge on the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. Another memorandum, dated March 6, 2003, from a
Defense Department working group convened by Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld to come up with new interrogation guidelines for
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, incorporated much, but not all, of
the legal thinking from the OLC memo.
137
The March 2003 memo ("DOD Working Group Memo") was
leaked in early June 2004.138 On June 22, 2004, the Bush
135. See discussion supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text (explaining
disapproval short of outright condemnation by the Committee Against Torture of
the U.S. reservation to Article 16 and understanding to Article 1).
136. See discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text (providing reports on
the alleged abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib).
137. See Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture 'May Be Justified,'
WASH. POST, June 13, 2004 (detailing internal memorandum from the CIA asking
the Office of Legal Counsel to consider the legality of aggressive interrogation
methods), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A 3 8 8 9 4 -
2004Junl3.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
138. See Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture
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Administration released the August 1, 2002 memo ("OLC Memo"),
along with other memos, letters, and orders related to recent
interrogation policy (specifically, regarding Afghanistan and Iraq as
well as the U.S. prison for "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo
Bay).139 President Bush has stated that he authorized only action that
would be "consistent with international treaty obligations"' 40 but has
never indicated whether he ever relied on controversial White House
Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") interpretations of those
obligations.
The OLC and DOD Working Group memos both discuss the
interpretation of torture and CIDT under CAT and related U.S. law.
They assert an extremely narrow interpretation of torture. For
example, severe physical pain or suffering is apparently limited to
death, loss of limb, or loss of organ function.'4' In addition, the
memos assert the controversial position that torture could be justified
by necessity, self-defense and/or the Commander-in-Chief power. 142
Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at Al (disclosing a legal
memorandum written by a team of administration lawyers stating that President
Bush was not bound by any international treaty or any federal anti-torture law
because his authority as Commander-in-Chief allowed him to approve any
interrogation technique needed to protect the nation's security).
139. See Priest, supra note 137 (detailing release of OLC and other memos); see
also OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 38 (claiming "[o]ne of the core functions of
the Commander-in-Chief is that of capturing, detaining, and interrogating members
of the enemy"); infra Part IV (providing an in-depth discussion of the OLC's
"torture" interpretation); DOD Working Group Memo, supra note 74, at 20 ("In
light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war, without a clear
statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the President's
ultimate authority in these areas.").
140. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President
Bush Holds Press Conference Following the G8 Summit (June 10, 2004)(mentioning George W. Bush could not recall whether he had ever read the OLC
memo), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-
36.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
141. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 5-6 (adapting the definition of "severe
pain" as described in various U.S. statutes concerned with defining an emergency
medical condition for the purpose of health care benefits). "Although these statutes
address a substantially different subject from Section 2340, they are nonetheless
helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical harm." Id. at 6.
142. See id. at 39-42 (arguing individual offenders could claim that their conduct
was necessary to avoid future harm to others that superseded the harm caused by
their torture, or that the use of force was a legitimate application of self-defense
because the potential harm was perceived as imminent and the amount of force
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The DOD Working Group Memo concludes that the President is not
bound by CAT or the federal torture statute, Section 2340, because
the Commander-in-Chief can approve any method necessary for
national security.
14 3
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham recently "accused the Bush
Administration of 'playing cute with the law' in its treatment of
prisoners in Iraq and elsewhere." 1" He criticized the memos on
torture for endangering the military. 145 Many prominent legal
scholars have also harshly criticized the memos. Harold Hongju Koh,
dean of the Yale Law School and Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the Clinton Administration,
described the legal analysis as "embarrassing" and "utterly
unjustifiable."' 46 Dean Koh compared the assertion of Commander-
in-Chief power to commit torture to an executive claim of "the
power to commit genocide, to sanction slavery, to promote apartheid,
to license summary execution.' 1 47 A bipartisan group of prestigious
used was proportional to the harm sought to be avoided).
143. See DOD Working Group Memo, supra note 74, at 21 ("In order to protect
the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, 18
U.S.C. § 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable
to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority."); see
also OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 31-46 (contending the prosecution of anyone
under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, who commits torture during interrogation of enemy
combatants, would be an unconstitutional interference with the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief). But the DOD Working Group Memo also
recognized that the ban on torture is absolute under CAT, and the United States
does not have a reservation or understanding to the contrary. See DOD Working
Group Memo, supra note 74, at 5. Specifically, the memo acknowledged that
Article 2 provides "acts of torture cannot be justified on the grounds of exigent
circumstances, such as a state war or public emergency, or on orders from a
superior officer or public authority." Id. Therefore, the arguments relating to
justification via necessity or following orders of the Commander-in-Chief are
inapposite as they relate to torture under CAT.
144. See Lichtblau, supra note 16 (describing Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing of Alberto Gonzales, nominee for Attorney General).
145. See id. (stating the current Bush Administration's approach to interrogation
has "dramatically undermined" the campaign against terrorism and endangered
U.S. troops who might be taken into custody).
146. See Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2004, at A14 (commenting it is not unusual for generally liberal law
professors to differ with broad interpretations of presidential power but "their
attack on the professional quality of the memos was unusually sharp").
147. See id. (also quoting others who have been less critical in evaluating the
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lawyers, including twelve former judges, issued a statement asserting
that the memos "ignore and misinterpret the U.S. Constitution and
laws, international treaties and rules of international law."'1 48 "The
critics spanned the political spectrum, reflecting a degree of
consensual outrage not often witnessed in an era defined largely by
the red-blue divide on issues of public import."'149
In response to the public outcry, the Bush Administration backed
away from the positions in the memos, at least in part. Even if all of
the positions in the memos have since been abandoned by the Bush
Administration, they provide the most extreme arguments in support
of preventive interrogational torture. But it is still not clear whether
the Bush Administration has fully repudiated the controversially
narrow interpretation of torture put forth in the memos. At the June
2004 Press Briefing where the memos were released, then-White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales stated the following with regard to
disowning the analysis in the memos:
Now, to the extent that some of these documents, in the context of
interrogations, explored broad legal theories, including legal theories
about the scope of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief, some
of their discussion, quite frankly, is irrelevant and unnecessary to support
any action taken by the President. The administration has made clear
before, and I will reemphasize today that the President has not authorized,
ordered or directed in any way any activity that would transgress the
standards of the torture conventions or the torture statute, or any other
applicable laws.
Unnecessary, over-broad discussions in some of these memos that
address abstract legal theories, or discussions subject to misinterpretation,
but not relied upon by decision-makers are under review, and may be
replaced, if appropriate, with more concrete guidance addressing only
memorandums by characterizing the analysis as merely incomplete or unpolished).
148. See Lawyers' Statement on Bush Admin.'s Torture Memos, August 4, 2004(protesting the memos' erroneous legal conclusions), at
http://www.independentjudiciary.com/resources/docs/0804statement.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
149. See Robert K. Vischer, Tortured Ethics: Abu Ghraib and the Moral
Lawyer, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2004), ST. JOHN'S LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER (using the
participation of the attorneys in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal to discuss attorneys' own moral
convictions in a broad professional context) (paper on file with author, abstract
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-601203).
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those issues necessary for the legal analysis of actual practices. But I must
emphasize that the analysis underpinning the President's decisions stands
and are not being reviewed. 50
He went on to clarify that the "unnecessary and over-broad"
positions were those asserting that a presidential determination of
necessity or self-defense might provide immunity from prosecution
for torture.' He also stated, "Whatever broad language might be
included in this legal memo, the United States government has never
authorized torture in reliance on the argument that the convention
against torture, or the torture statute are somehow inapplicable to the
current conflict."'5 But he refused to answer questions about the
memo's analysis of the definition of torture. In response to a question
about the criticism of the OLC interpretation of torture as too narrow,
Gonzales replied, "I haven't looked at that memo closely recently. So
in terms of what that memo actually says, I'm not going to comment
specifically on it."' 53
150. See Judge Alberto Gonzales et al., Press Briefing at the Eisenhower
Executive Office Building (June 22, 2004) (arguing the memo reflects a policy that
the administration finds necessary to wage a global war against terror and that the
new face of war, with combatants who do not abide by the Geneva Convention,
presents unprecedented "legal and practical questions for policymakers trying to
defend the United States"), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/ 2 0 0 4 06
2 2
-14.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
151. See id. (noting the U.S. neither commits nor condones torture and there has
been no presidential determination permitting torture in the name of self-defense
and security).
152. See id. (insisting the U.S. has only used interrogation techniques against
Taliban and Al Qaeda members and in Iraq in accordance with U.S. obligations
under CAT).
153. See id. (avoiding a question about the memo's interpretation of torture and
noting that the Department of Justice would be giving a briefing "so they can
certainly talk about their definition of torture"). The DOJ press briefing was not
recorded or transcribed. See John W. Dean, The Torture Memo By Judge Jay S.
Bybee that Haunted Alberto Gonzales's Confirmation Hearings, FINDLAW, Jan.
14, 2005 (explaining pen and pad backgrounder as a briefing that only those with
media credentials can attend; no record or transcript is available); see also
Department of Justice Media Advisory, Senior Justice Department Official to Hold
Background Briefing June 22, 2004 (pen and pad briefing) (describing background
briefing), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/200 4 / June/04_opa_427.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
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Thus, the administration initially repudiated the memo's most
radical positions regarding the President's authority as Commander-
in-Chief and other justifications for torture, but this did not affect the
memo's controversial analysis of what behavior constitutes torture.
The administration, however, took a different stance on the memo
after President Bush nominated Gonzales for Attorney General.' 54
Days before the Senate hearings on Gonzales' nomination, the OLC
released a new memo regarding the legal interpretation of torture.'55
The new memo ("Revised OLC Memo") "supersedes" the OLC
Memo of August, 2002 "in its entirety.' 15 6
It is not entirely clear, however, that the legal interpretations
regarding Commander-in-Chief power and potential defenses to
liability have been disavowed as erroneous; rather, they are referred
to as "unnecessary" in light of the President's statements that U.S.
personnel should not engage in torture. 57 When asked whether he
agreed with the memo's position that the Commander-in-Chief could
ignore the ban on torture if the President found it unconstitutional,
Gonzales replied: "I guess I would have to say that hypothetically
that authority may exist."'58 The Revised OLC Memo does broaden
the interpretation of the definition of torture in some respects, for
example, by explicitly disagreeing with its limitation of severe pain
to serious physical injury such as organ failure or death. 59 In
154. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Toughens Rule on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at A l (referring to the nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney
General).
155. See id. (describing an unannounced posting of a memo on the Department's
website one week before the hearings where Gonzales was expected to be
questioned about his role in formulating the much criticized policies on
interrogation).
156. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel: Memorandum for
James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., at 1-2 (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Revised OLC Memo] (describing questions raised about the August 2002 memo
and announcing its replacement by this memo), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/dojtorturel 23004mem.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
157. See id. at 2 (stating because discussion of Commander-in-Chief power and
potential defenses was unnecessary, the analysis has been omitted as inconsistent
with the President's directive).
158. See Lichtblau, supra note 16 (relating the opinions of Alberto Gonzales on
presidential powers to allow torture for purposes of interrogation).
159. See Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 9 n.17 (advising what acts
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addition, the memo seems to expand the interpretation of specific
intent by declining to reiterate the requirement of proof that the
''precise objective" of the actor is to inflict pain or suffering,
although it retains the requirement of specific intent. 160 The
interpretation of the OLC is "definitive" according to the former
White House Counsel. 1
61
Despite the recent developments regarding the original OLC
Memo, there are other memos that might provide similar or even
more controversial interpretations of torture. According to Senator
Patrick Leahy, the documents released by the Bush Administration
are only a "small subset" of the relevant documents. 162 There is a
still-classified August 2002 memo that is "far more detailed and
explicit than another August 2002 document generated by Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel concerning U.S. obligations under anti-
torture law."' 63 It is said to spell out specific interrogation methods
would and would not constitute torture under U.S. obligations to CAT); see also
discussion infra Part 1V.A. 1 (discussing interpretation of severe pain or suffering).
160. See Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 16 n.27 (discussing precise
objective test); see also discussion infra Part IV (analyzing severe pain or suffering
as well as specific intent requirement).
161. See Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, for the President (Jan.
25, 2002) (referring to the OLC position as definitive while considering the
benefits and disadvantages to applying the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in response to the DOJ's legal
opinion that the Convention does not apply to Al Qaeda and that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that it also does not apply to the Taliban), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek (last visited Apr. 2,
2005); see also Priest, supra note 137 (noting the signature of the head of OLC on
the memo renders it "akin to binding legal opinion on government policy on
interrogations").
162. See Sen. Patrick Leahy, Reaction to White House Release of Certain
Documents Relating to the Prison Abuse Scandal (June 22, 2004) (displaying the
Senator's frustration with the manner in which Congress has been denied its
oversight duties and stressing the need for an investigation to examine the prison
abuse scandal), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/20040 6 /06 2 2 04 b.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
163. See Toni Locy & John Diamond, Memo lists acceptable 'aggressive'
interrogation methods, USA TODAY, June 27, 2004 (describing memos
inaccessible to the public that could sanction interrogation techniques harsher than
those in publicly-disclosed memos), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-06-27-cia-interrogation-
methods_x.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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that the CIA could use against Al Qaeda members.' 64 Moreover, a
footnote in the Revised OLC Memo refers to other OLC opinions
regarding treatment of detainees that are not superseded by the
Revised OLC Memo and are reportedly still classified. 65 According
to unnamed officials, the footnote means that the classified opinions
sanctioning coercive techniques under the old memo are still valid
under the Revised OLC Memo. 166 In addition, the White House
recently pressured Congressional leaders to delete from the
intelligence reform legislation a measure that "would have explicitly
extended to intelligence officers a prohibition against torture or
inhumane treatment, and would have required the CIA as well as the
Pentagon to report to Congress about the methods they were
using. ' ' 167 Thus, the original interpretation of torture in the OLC
Memo will be used in conjunction with the Revised OLC Memo to
analyze U.S. commitments under CAT.
III. CIDT (CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT)
It is unlikely that preventive interrogational truth serum would
constitute CIDT when the U.S. reservation is taken into account.
Domestic relief based on the U.S. Constitution, however, might exist
if truth serum is considered to be particularly egregious and
shocking. The U.S. reservation to Article 16168 of CAT provides:
164. See id. (reporting the Justice Department wrote the memo in response to a
CIA request for specific guidance on the handling of "high-value al-Qaeda
captives").
165. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House Fought Curbs on
Interrogations, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al (citing officials
who describe the opinions as still-classified); see also Revised OLC Memo, supra
note 156, at 2 n.8 (stating conclusions in prior opinions on treatment of detainees
would not be different under new standards).
166. See Jehl & Johnston, supra note 165 (noting that "[t]he footnote meant, the
officials said, that coercive techniques approved by the Justice Department under
the looser interpretation of the torture statutes were still lawful even under the new,
more restrictive interpretation").
167. Id. (describing restrictions on extreme interrogation tactics that were
approved by the Senate but deleted in the face of White House opposition).
168. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 16 (providing that "each State Party shall
undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
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[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article
16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,'
only insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment' means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
169
Although the U.S. reservation focuses on cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, other constitutional bases
for banning interrogational torture are also briefly discussed below. 17 0
A. BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In general, the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment does not apply to torture during interrogations. 171 "As a
technical legal matter, the protections of the Eighth Amendment
apply only to 'punishments', that is, to the treatment of individuals
who have been convicted of a crime and are therefore in the custody
of the Government."' 172 In Ingraham v. Wright,173 the Supreme Court
affirmed this determination:
An examination of the history of the [Eighth] Amendment and the
decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes. We adhere to this longstanding limitation and hold
defined under article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity").
169. U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Reservation 1.
170. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (concluding the Committee Against
Torture neither found the reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty nor indicated that the reservations were incompatible and severable,
although it recommended that the RUDs be withdrawn). As a result, the analysis of
U.S. obligations regarding CIDT will accept the U.S. reservation. Id.
171. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 19 (1990) (determining that the limited
scope of the Eighth Amendment protects "only those convicted of crimes").
172. See INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 122, 108 (citing
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
173. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a
means of maintaining discipline in public schools. 174
Because Ingraham dealt with corporal punishment in public
schools, it is unclear whether its reasoning would apply to official
interrogation of suspected terrorists. In Hudson v. McMillian,175 the
Court held that excessive physical force used against a prisoner, such
as a beating that causes minor bruising and swelling, may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment even without significant physical
injury. 176 In reaching this determination, the Court relied on Estelle v.
Gamble177 for the proposition that "proscribing torture and barbarous
punishment was 'the primary concern of the drafters' of the Eighth
Amendment."' 178 This arguably implies that the Eighth Amendment
covers even pre-conviction punishment such as torturous
interrogation. But the Hudson Court also cited Wilkerson v. Utah 179
for the statement: "it is safe to affirm that punishment of torture...
and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden
174. See id. at 664 (deciding the students did not have Eighth Amendment
protections and the teachers and administrators were privileged at common law to
inflict such corporal punishment as necessary for the students' education and
discipline).
175. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
176. See id. at 7 (establishing that in determining whether the use of force was
wanton and unnecessary, other factors such as "the need for application of force,
the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat
'reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,' and 'any efforts made to
temper the severity of a forceful response"' should also be considered). The
absence of serious injury, therefore, does not bar the finding of cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (holding that the
inmate was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he was exposed to
serious risk of harm by being handcuffed to a hitching post in the sun for seven
hours with little water and no bathroom breaks).
177. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding although a deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Eighth Amendment, a prisoner's pro se complaint showing that
medical personnel had seen and treated him on seventeen occasions within a three-
month period was insufficient to state a cause of action against physician although
other officials might be liable).
178. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 102, to illustrate the
original intent behind the Eighth Amendment).
179. 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (sentencing person convicted of capital offense in
territories to death by shooting does not violate Eighth Amendment).
[20:521
Is TRUTH SERUM TORTURE?
by [the Eighth Amendment].""18 The latter language indicates that
"cruel and unusual punishment" is indeed limited to punishment and
thus inapplicable to interrogation.' 8' Therefore, preventive
interrogational truth serum would not constitute CIDT. But even if
torturous interrogation does not fall under the Eighth Amendment, it
might be barred by the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause 82 or the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process
Clause.'83
B. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The admission into evidence of a confession, which was derived
by the use of truth serum, in a criminal proceeding would most likely
violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 4 Yet torturous
180. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citing Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136).
181. But see Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the
Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661, 665 (2004) (arguing
the history of and interpretations of the Eighth Amendment suggest that it should
apply more broadly to cover interrogation and possibly ban the use of compulsive
questioning); see also A.L. DeWitt, The Ultimate Exigent Circumstance, 5 KAN. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 169, 176 (1996) ("The use of pain to extract information might be
considered a form of punishment, irrespective of whether a person had been
properly tried and convicted."); Sen. Richard Durbin, Floor Statement on the
Durbin Torture Amendment, 150 Cong. Rec. S. 6781 (June 15, 2004) (claiming
"[d]uring the Constitutional Convention, George Mason, who is known as 'the
Father of the Bill of Rights,' explained that the Fifth Amendment ban on self-
incrimination and the Eighth Amendment ban of cruel and unusual punishment
both prohibit torture and cruel treatment"), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/
site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=91568&printmode= 1 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
182. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall . . . be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself....").
183. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1 ("No person shall.., be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " and incorporating this
right to the states by providing "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
184. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing that Voluntariness
of Confession or Admission Was Affected By Alcohol or Other Drugs - Drugs or
Narcotics Administered as Part of Medical Treatment and Drugs or Intoxicants
Administered by the Police, 96 A.L.R.5th 523 (2004) (examining the voluntariness
of confession, admission, or waiver of rights after ingestion of a drug or narcotic
and finding that the influence of drugs or narcotics at the time of confession is a
factor to consider in determining the level of coercion or voluntariness); see also
N. J. Marini, Annotation, Physiological or Psychological Truth and Deception
2005]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
interrogation itself would not necessarily violate the privilege against
self-incrimination. The Bush Administration made a similar "trial
rights" argument with regard to the Miranda'85 warning. The OLC
argued that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause is a
trial right that would not prohibit "an unwarned custodial
interrogation as a constitutional violation in itself"'86 Similarly,
torturous interrogation would not violate the Fifth Amendment
unless and until a coerced statement is introduced during a criminal
proceeding, based on the OLC's rationale that the Fifth Amendment
is a trial right. 87 Thus, so long as the subject is never prosecuted,
preventive interrogational torture does not violate the ban on self-
incrimination.
On the other hand, the privilege against self-incrimination might
be broad enough to cover interrogations even where no criminal
charges are brought. In a recent case considering a civil claim based
on coercive interrogation, the Supreme Court appeared divided on
this issue. In Chavez v. Martinez, 8  Martinez was shot during an
Tests, 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (2004) (addressing the admissibility in evidence of results
of physiological or psychological tests to determine scientifically the truth or
falsity of oral statements or testimony and suggesting that a criminal confession
made under the influence of a drug is obtained involuntarily and therefore
inadmissible); Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Admissibility of Physiological or
Psychological Truth and Deception Test or Its Results to Support Physician's
Testimony, 41 A.L.R.3d 1369 (2004) (illustrating the fact that one has undergone
physiological or psychological truth or deception tests is generally admissible, but
that the admissibility of the results of, or recording of, the test to support physician
testimony is dependent upon the particular court).
185. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing procedures to
ensure the privilege against self-incrimination during police interrogation).
186. See Memorandum from Asst. U.S. Attorney General Jay Bybee, to U.S.
Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes 3 (Feb. 26, 2002)
(explaining neither the Self-Incrimination Clause nor Miranda established all
possible guidelines by which agents of the federal government should conduct
interrogations), available at http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-
srv/nation/documents/022602bybee.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
187. See id. at 4 (arguing for a "public safety" defense to Miranda warnings).
Although the memo stresses the use of Miranda as "a rule of conduct for law
enforcement officers to prevent practices that might lead to defendants making
involuntary statements," it sets forth a broad public safety defense that could be
interpreted to justify torturous interrogation. Id.
188. 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (remanding civil claim against police sergeant for
torture based on rights under substantive due process).
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altercation with the police.189 While Martinez was undergoing
medical treatment for bullet wounds that left him permanently blind
and paralyzed from the waist down, a police officer questioned him
despite Martinez's repeated statements "I am dying," "I am
choking," and "I am not telling you anything until they treat me.' 190
Martinez was not prosecuted for the crime that the police were
investigating when they stopped him and he subsequently sued the
police sergeant for violating his constitutional rights.191
Four Justices rejected the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
basis for Martinez's civil suit under § 1983.192 Justices Thomas,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist determined, "The text
of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the Ninth
Circuit's view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without
more, violates the Constitution."'1 93 Coercion alone does not violate
the Self-Incrimination Clause unless the compelled statements are
used against the individual in a criminal case. 94 Martinez's privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated because he was never
made to incriminate himself through introduction of the statements in
a criminal case. 95
189. See id. at 763-64 (explaining the details of the dispute between Martinez
and the police officer which led to the gun wounds and the arrest of Martinez).
190. Id. (noting interview lasted approximately ten minutes and the police
officer did not issue Miranda warnings at any point).
191. See id. at 764-65 (reporting Martinez's complaint maintained that the
police officer's actions violated both his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
192. See id. at 766-73 (Thomas, J., announcing the judgment of the Court and
delivering an opinion in which the Chief Justice joined in its entirety and Justice
O'Connor and Scalia joined in part) (deciding that, absent a prosecution for a
crime, Martinez could not have been called to act as a witness against himself, and
that the Fifth Amendment protections were not invoked); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994) (mandating in part that any person who causes a citizen of the U.S.
to be deprived "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .... ).
193. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (Thomas, J., announcing the judgment of the Court
and delivering an opinion).
194. See id. at 770 (reaffirming the Fifth Amendment privilege may only be
asserted if an individual is coerced to produce evidence that is later used against
him or her in a criminal action).
195. See id. at 767 (concluding Martinez was never a witness against himself
since his statements were never admitted as testimony in a criminal case).
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In contrast, Justice Souter, in an opinion joined by Justice Breyer,
stated that although an expansion of the Fifth Amendment protection
would be necessary to recognize Martinez's claim, the need for
expansion alone is not sufficient to reject his claim.' 96 Where the core
guarantee against self-incrimination would be endangered without a
"complementary protection," the privilege would support additional
protection such as a ban on compulsory interrogation. 97
Nevertheless, Martinez failed to make the "powerful showing"
necessary for such an expansion. 98
Three Justices were willing to go further than the position held by
Justice Souter. 199 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice
Kennedy in holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause imposes
substantive restraints on governmental conduct, rather than merely
functioning as an evidentiary rule applicable solely at trial.2 °0
According to this view, the privilege applies when the police compel
a statement.20 1 "The Constitution does not countenance the official
imposition of severe pain or pressure for purposes of
interrogation. ' 20 2 A constitutional right is violated as soon as torture
196. See id. at 777-78 (Souter, J. concurring) (providing examples of how Fifth
Amendment guarantees would be at risk if individuals were not provided with
certain complementary protections).
197. See id. (Souter, J. concurring) (suggesting judges may need to exercise their
judicial capacity to protect Fifth Amendment rights).
198. See id. at 778 (Souter, J. concurring) (expressing concern over lack of a
limiting principle to Martinez's argument to expand protection of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination to the point of the civil liability on these
facts).
199. See id. at 790 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Justice Souter and Justice Thomas are wrong, in my view, to maintain that in all
instances a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply does not occur unless
and until a statement is introduced at trial .... ).
200. See id. at 791 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing that such a limited view of the Self-Incrimination Clause would not
adequately safeguard the right against compulsion that the Clause seeks to
prohibit).
201. See id. (putting forth the argument that the Clause provides a "continuing
right against government conduct intended to bring about self-incrimination").
202. Id. at 795-96 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(maintaining a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause does occur even when the
coerced statement is not introduced at trial).
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is used, not "held in abeyance" until the victim is prosecuted.2 °3
Justice Ginsburg stated that the privilege against self-incrimination is
"[c]losely connected with the struggle to eliminate torture as a
governmental practice."2° According to Justice Stevens, the audio
recording of the interrogation by the officer "vividly demonstrates
that respondent was suffering severe pain and mental anguish
throughout petitioner's persistent questioning. '20 5 These three
Justices would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's finding of a § 1983
claim based on the Fifth Amendment, but this would have left the
Court with no controlling authority.20 6 Thus, they joined with Justice
Souter's opinion remanding for reconsideration based on due
process. 20 7
In light of the multiple rationales and opinions in Chavez v.
Martinez, it appears that the privilege against self-incrimination
could apply to interrogations, but a party must meet a high threshold
in order to provide a basis for a majority finding on the current Court
(i.e., a "powerful showing" sufficient to convince Justices Souter and
Breyer to join Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Ginsburg in finding
that the conduct constitutes a violation). 20 8  The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, however, may be more readily
applicable to a claim of interrogational torture.20 9
203. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 789-90 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stressing how a future privilege does not negate a present
right).
204. Id. at 801-02 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(affirming the privilege against self-incrimination is a facet of civilized
government conduct).
205. See id. at 786 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(providing a transcript of the questioning that occurred in the emergency room of
the hospital).
206. See id. at 799 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating the choice to join in Justice Souter's opinion was based on a decision to
ensure a controlling judgment of the Court).
207. See id. (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the
ruling on substantive due process grounds could provide much of the critical
protection that the Self-Incrimination Clause should secure).
208. See discussion supra notes 192-207 and accompanying text (providing
overviews of the Justices' differing opinions and rationales).
209. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779 (Souter, J. concurring) (suggesting a claim of
outrageous police conduct actionable under § 1983 must find its base in
2005]
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C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In Townsend v. Sain, the Supreme Court determined that the
admission of a drug-induced confession in a criminal case violates
the Constitution.210 The Court determined that a confession is
inadmissible when the individual's will is overborne or the
confession is not the product of free will.2 1' In fact, the Court stated:
"It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be
less the product of free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought
about by a drug having the effect of a 'truth serum.'"2 1
But is coercive interrogation, in and of itself, a violation of the
constitutional right to due process? Several scholars have argued that
interrogational torture-regardless of prosecution-violates the
Constitution based on substantive due process. 21I3 The Supreme Court
in Rochin v. California famously held that a method of obtaining
evidence for a criminal prosecution that "shocks the conscience"
violates the Due Process Clause.21 '4 The Court equated the police
conduct to "methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
substantive due process).
210. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963), rev'd on other grounds
by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (finding standards governing
confessions resulting from physical intimidation and psychological pressure are the
same standards governing drug-induced statements).
211. See id. at 307 (asserting such a confession is inadmissible due to its coerced
nature).
212. Id. at 307-08; see Strauss, supra note 27, at 222 ("use of 'truth serum'
would almost certainly render a confession inadmissible in a court of law because
an accused's self-determination and free will would be violated in the most basic
sense"); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 43, (arguing torturous interrogation does
not violate the Constitution unless the statement is admitted in court).
213. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw:
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278, 294 (2003) (concluding interrogation tactics that shock the conscience of the
court violate the Constitution as a substantive matter, although neither the Self-
Incrimination Clause nor the Eighth Amendment alone apply to investigatory
torture).
214. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (detailing conduct
where police officers saw the petitioner swallow capsules suspected to contain
illegal drugs, subsequently attempted to forcibly extract the capsules from the
petitioner's mouth, and then later had petitioner's stomach pumped against his
will).
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constitutional differentiation. '215  The Court explained that
involuntary confessions are excluded not only because of
unreliability, but because the use of coerced confessions is repugnant
to society's sense of fairness.
216
The Bush Administration has conceded that under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses, interrogation techniques
that "shock the conscience" are to be analyzed under substantive due
process, rather than the standard due process balancing test.
217
According to the DOD Working Group Memo, beating or
sufficiently intimidating a suspect during the course of an
interrogation could amount to conscience-shocking conduct.21 8 In
addition, "certain psychologically-coercive interrogation techniques
could constitute a violation of substantive due process," although the
use of deceit or sympathy would not.219
Since Rochin v. California, the Court has determined that
involuntary extraction of blood does not shock the conscience.22° In
Breithaupt v. Abram, the Court held that drawing blood while a
suspected drunk-driver was unconscious did not offend a sense of
justice.2 ' The Court emphasized that such action was not deemed
215. See id. at 172 (noting the government agents engaged in tactics that were
"bound to offend even hardened sensibilities").
216. See id. at 173 (emphasizing the fairness concern in addition to reliability).
217. See DOD Working Group Memo, supra note 74, at 42 (citing Rochin v.
California for the proposition that some conduct is so egregious that it cannot be
justified).
218. See id. at 44.
219. See id. (providing examples of circuit court decisions in which
psychologically-coercive interrogation tactics violated substantive due process,
especially if the express purpose of such tactics was to keep the suspect from
testifying in his own defense).
220. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (holding that the warrantless
extraction of blood from an unconscious defendant by a physician acting at the
direction of the police did not violate the defendant's right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and was therefore properly admitted in a prosecution for
manslaughter); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding
that the results of a blood-alcohol test conducted over the defendant's objection
were admissible).
221. See Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435-37 (maintaining due process is measured
against an entire community's sense of justice and civility, and not the personal
reactions of a particular individual).
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brutal or offensive when performed under the supervision of a
physician in a hospital.22 In Schmerber v. California, the Court used
a similar approach to analyze a blood sample's admissibility under
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure. 23 The Court did not address whether the conduct would
shock the conscience and thereby violate due process.2 24 But, as in
Breithaupt, the Court stressed that a blood test is a highly effective,
routine procedure carried out in accordance with accepted medical
standards.225
The administration of a next-generation truth serum might be
characterized as an effective and low risk medical procedure,226
although mental trauma is likely, as discussed in Part IV. Thus, the
Court might well find the use of truth serum to be closer to the
acceptable blood extraction than the unconstitutional stomach
pumping.227
222. See id at 435 (noting blood tests have become a routine aspect of everyday
life and that a blood sample taken by a skilled technician does not constitute action
that "shocks the conscience").
223. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760, 767-71 (securing from a suspect evidence
of his/her blood-alcohol'content was appropriate action incident to arrest because a
delay would have degraded the evidence since the percentage of alcohol in the
bloodstream begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops).
224. See id. at 759-60 (rejecting petitioner's due process claim because the
blood extraction was performed by a physician and in a hospital environment using
a simple, medically acceptable process).
225. See id. at 771-72 (suggesting a technique of a more rudimentary variety or
a procedure performed by non-medical personnel in a non-medical environment
might not be tolerated).
226. See Strauss, supra note 27, at 237-38 (speculating a court is unlikely to find
that the injection of "truth serum" amounts to severe bodily intrusion or is a
process which shocks the conscience). But see Jessica Pae, Note, The
Emasculation of Compelled Testimony: Battling the Effects of Judicially Imposed
Limitations on Grand Jury Investigations of Terrorism and Other Ideological
Crimes, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 473, 502-03 (1997) (arguing so-called truth serum
drugs carry an inherent risk of death, nerve damage and other injuries).
227. See Strauss, supra note 27, at 237-39 (contending the Supreme Court's
decision in Breithaupt v. Abrams bolsters the position that a due process violation
would require something more brutal or offensive than the taking of a sample of
blood by a member of the medical profession); see also Odeshoo, supra note 27, at
230 (speculating conduct at issue in Rochin might be viewed as a greater breach of
due process than use of truth serum).
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The multiple opinions in Chavez v. Martinez,2 8 however, make it
difficult to make predictions with any confidence. A bare majority of
the Court determined: "Whether Martinez may pursue a claim of
liability for a substantive due process violation is ... an issue that
should be addressed on remand, along with the scope and merits of
any such action that may be found open to him.
229
According to Justice Stevens, the Due Process Clause protects
against behavior that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.230 He concluded that the
interrogation amounted to torture aimed at obtaining an involuntary
confession. "As a matter of law, that type of brutal police conduct
constitutes an immediate deprivation of the prisoner's
constitutionally protected interest in liberty. '23 1 Justice Souter relied
on Justice Steven's opinion to conclude that Martinez has a "serious
argument" in support of a substantive due process claim based on
official action rising to the "conscience-shocking" level.232
Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the narrow scope of the Self-Incrimination
Clause's protection 233 does not mean "that police torture or other
abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible so
long as the statements are not used at trial; it simply means that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause would govern the
228. See discussion supra notes 188-209 and accompanying text (discussing
Chavez v. Martinez, including various opinions regarding the claimed violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination).
229. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 779-80 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
230. See id. at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining how unusually coercive police interrogation procedures do violate the
standard ).
231. Id. at 786 (depicting, in a transcript of a sound recording during his
interrogation by Chavez, the agony of Martinez expressing his belief he was about
to die).
232. See id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998), to show that any argument for a damages remedy
depends on the particular charge of outrageous conduct by the police).
233. See discussion supra Part III.B (recounting the constitutional protections
under the self-incrimination clause).
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inquiry .... *"234 Nevertheless, these four justices determined that
Chavez's questioning was not conscience-shocking.235  The
conclusion of Justice Thomas' opinion, joined in its entirety only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated: "Because Chavez did not violate
Martinez's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, he was entitled
to qualified immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings. 236 Justice Scalia insisted that there is no basis
for remand to determine the substantive due process claim because it
was either decided already by the Ninth Circuit or forfeited.237
Despite the apparent disagreement over the outcome of the case, it
was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.238 On remand,
the court found that Martinez's allegations are sufficient to "shock
the conscience" and violate the right to be free from coercive
interrogation.239 It therefore appears that the administration of truth
serum would be considered by the lower courts, and possibly a
majority of the Supreme Court, to be a violation of due process if it
is sufficient to "shock the conscience.
Regardless of the substantive due process argument, the use or
threatened use of truth serum is not CIDT under CAT because the
U.S. understanding limits it to "cruel and unusual punishment. '24' Of
234. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773 (Thomas, J., announcing the judgment of the Court
and delivering an opinion).
235. See id. at 774-75 (determining methods were not "so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity" that they "shoc[k] the conscience").
236. Id. at 776 (asserting there is no right not to be talked to).
237. See id. at 783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the judgment) (denying the
Court has authority to remand under the circumstances).
238. See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S.Ct. 2932 (2004) (determining a police sergeant's alleged coercive
interrogation of a suspect, after the suspect had been shot by another police officer,
would violate a suspect's clearly established due process rights).
239. See Martinez, 337 F.2d at 1092 (stating it is a right, fundamental to ordered
liberty, to be free from coercive police interrogation).
240. But see DeWitt, supra note 181, at 174 (stating it is "by no means clear that
the Court would find the use of mind-altering substances in this instance [ticking
nuclear bomb scenario] shocking").
241. But cf Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong. 100-20 (1990) (statement of Senator Jesse Helms)
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course, if truth serum violates other constitutional rights,242 this in
itself would prohibit use by the United States regardless of CAT
standards.
IV. PREVENTIVE INTERROGATIONAL TRUTH
SERUM AS TORTURE
Although U.S. commitments related to CIDT do not bar truth
serum, U.S. commitments regarding torture may ban its use. The
analysis concludes that the use of interrogational truth serum does
not constitute torture, but its threatened application does.
Based on Article 1 of CAT, the definition of torture243 can be
broken down as follows: (1) an act causing severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (2) intentionally inflicted on the victim (3) for
(allowing for the argument that the substantive due process clause protection for
those under interrogation is merely an extension of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause). This would be a plausible argument when discussing the
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states; but when courts interpret the Due Process Clause without reference to
"cruel or unusual punishment" as discussed above, it must be assumed that due
process itself is the locus of the right.
242. See DeWitt, supra note 181 (indicating there may also be a potential Fourth
Amendment claim, but that the exceptions of exigent circumstances or public
safety might provide a basis for the Court to allow the use of "chemically-induced
cooperation"); see also Strauss, supra note 27, at 238 n.133 (stating truth serum is
likely justified even without probable cause or warrant if exigent circumstances
exist). In addition, coercive interrogation might give rise to a First Amendment
claim related to freedom of belief and speech. See Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU
of Eastern Missouri in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at pt. III.A, U.S. v. Sell 282 F.3d
560, (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-5664), 2002 WL 32135465 (raising the argument that
involuntary medication may give rise to a First Amendment claim because it
interferes with one's ability to think and to communicate ideas).
243. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (defining torture in pertinent part as the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering:
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity).
The list of purposes is illustrative, not exhaustive. OLC MEMO, supra note 127, at
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certain purposes (4) by an official actor. Parts three and four are
clearly met in the preventive interrogational truth serum scenario
described above.2" Parts one and two are more problematic, even
assuming that the truth serum subject is conscious of the mind
control exerted during the session.245
The next-generation truth serum would involve no physical pain
but would also allow the subject to maintain awareness throughout
the session, though without the ability to censor his responses during
questioning. This waking nightmare scenario would mean potential
mental pain or suffering occurring simultaneously with the
administration of the truth serum.246 This scenario raises two
questions under CAT: (1) Does the mental harm caused by mind
control via truth serum rise to the level necessary for torture?
(2) Does the mental pain have to take place before the truth serum
session, as a beating would take place before a coerced confession?
This Part first examines whether the potential anguish arising from a
truth serum session is sufficient to constitute "severe" mental pain or
suffering. It then explores whether mental pain contemporaneous
with the purpose (i.e., a side effect) would satisfy the intent
requirement.
244. In the interrogational truth serum scenario, a government interrogator-a
public official or person acting in an official capacity-is administering, or
threatening to administer, truth serum for the purpose of obtaining information
from a suspected terrorist. Thus, preventive interrogational truth serum would
satisfy parts three and four of the definition of torture.
245. See discussion infra Part L.A (describing effects of next-generation truth
serum).
246. Alternatively, the mental pain or suffering might be felt subsequent to the
truth serum session. In other words, the subject might be unaware of what he is
saying while he is under the influence of the truth serum. If this were the case, the
mental pain would arise after the truth serum wears off and the subject realizes that
the officials have the information. If a side effect of truth serum were the loss of
memory of the session, it is possible that the subject would never know or at least
never be certain that his statements led to the demise of a planned attack. Even if
he were to learn for certain, such knowledge might not be gained until some time
after the session. As a result, it is unlikely that the use of truth serum where the
subject is unaware of its effects would fit the definitional language requiring an
act, by which pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted.
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A. SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING
The anticipated defenses to a claim that preventive interrogational
truth serum causes severe mental pain or suffering are:
(1) CAT's requirement of "severe" mental pain or suffering cannot
be satisfied;
(2) U.S. understanding 1 's requirement of prolonged harm cannot
be satisfied;
(3) U.S. understanding l's requirement of a "mind altering" drug
that disrupts the senses or personality cannot be satisfied.
Based on decisions of international bodies, as well as the travaux
preparatoires and legislative history of CAT, the requirement of
"severe" pain or suffering does not categorically exclude truth serum.
In addition, the U.S. understanding encompasses truth serum because
preventive interrogational truth serum can cause prolonged mental
pain by affecting the sense of self and personality.247
1. Severe Mental Pain under CAT
a. Prior Decisions of Human Rights Bodies
Mental pain or suffering has not been extensively discussed by the
Committee Against Torture, most likely because the majority of
complaints deal with physical torture or a combination of physical
and mental pain, particularly under Article 3.248 In one recent case,
the individual opinion of Fernando Marino and Alejandro Gonzalez
Polete put forth an expansive reading of torture.249 Unlike the rest of
247. See Strauss, supra note 27, at 274 n.36 (stating CAT includes truth serum
as prohibited torture, and the Regulations adopted by the United States to
implement the Convention seemingly agree); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340
(expressing torture includes the administration or threatened application of mind
altering substances calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or the personality).
248. See discussion supra note 101 (describing CAT provisions establishing the
Committee Against Torture and how the Committee operates as a monitoring
body). Article 3 prohibits the return of an alien to a country where she would be
subjected to torture. CAT, supra note 30.
249. See Views of the Committee Against Torture Under Article 22 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 29th Sess., Annex, Complaint No. 161/2000, Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia
(individual opinion by Mr. Fernando Marifio and Mr. Alejandro Gonzdilez Poblete
under rule 113 of the Rules of Procedure), CAT/C/29/D/ 161/2000 (2002) (arguing
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the Committee, these members would have found torture where a
Roma community was violently displaced from its settlement.2 50 The
individual opinion concluded that the facts showed a "presumption
of 'severe suffering,' certainly 'mental"' but also physical even in
the absence of direct aggression. 251 This opinion illustrates the broad
range of facts that can give rise to severe mental suffering; due to the
split among the Committee, however, no definitive meaning for
"severe pain or suffering" can be discerned.
Other human rights bodies have considered the ban on torture,
including mental torture. The European Commission on Human
Rights has defined mental torture as the "infliction of mental
suffering by creating a state of anguish and stress by means other
than bodily assault. 15 2 As one judge of the European Court of
Human Rights stated, "One is not bound to regard torture as only
present in a mediaeval dungeon where the appliances of the rack and
thumbscrew or similar devices were employed. Indeed in the present-
day world there can be little doubt that torture may be inflicted in the
mental sphere. ' 253 The European Court of Human Rights has
indicated that some types of evidence, like that derived from a "truth
drug, coercion or torture," are "absolutely prohibited as a matter of
that the conduct in question was not merely "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment," but that it constituted torture), at
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIMJCaseLaw/fulltextcat.nsf/ac824e 16154a0621 c 1256d3d003
321f6/dc5a7bb97f8a90e741256d52003d6cbe?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
250. See id. (finding the nature of the resettlement was aggravated by the fact
that some of the complainants were still hidden in the settlement when the houses
were burnt and destroyed, the alleged victims were vulnerable and the acts were
committed with a significant level of racial motivation).
251. See id. (emphasis added) (establishing torture where the members of the
group were forcibly displaced from their homes, did not receive compensation
seven years after this happened, and were part of an ethnic group known to be
vulnerable).
252. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at 90 (citing 12 Yearbook-The Greek Case
461 (1967) for the European Commission's definition of mental harm).
253. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (ser. A) (separate
opinion of Judge O'Donoghue) (1978); 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (1979-80) (emphasis added)
(noting the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms which provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); see also European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, opened for
signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
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public policy. ' 254 This dictum implies that use of truth serum would
be considered torture, but does not provide a conclusive
determination or rationale. Because persuasive authority is not
particularly helpful, the intent of the drafters of CAT must be
examined.
b. In tent of the Drafters of CA T
The working groups that drafted CAT did not debate what would
be covered by severe mental pain or suffering.255 Nonetheless, it is
possible to evaluate the positions of various states to discern a
plausible interpretation of the severity requirement.256 The OLC's
initial interpretation of the negotiating history of CAT overstates the
severity requirement.
According to the OLC, "the state parties to CAT rejected a
proposal to include in CAT's definition of torture the use of truth
drugs, where no physical or mental suffering was apparent. This
rejection at least suggests that such drugs were not viewed as
amounting to torture per se. ' ' 257 The effective truth serum discussed
here does not cause significant physical pain. But mental pain is
another matter. The rejected proposal could indicate that the states
drafting CAT intended to include truth drugs where mental suffering
is apparent.
The OLC misinterpreted the rejection of the proposal by
Barbados.2 58 Barbados suggested that the definition of torture be
254. See Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 261 (1988); 13
E.H.R.R. 242 (1991) (holding that where corroborating evidence exists, unlawfully
obtained evidence might be admitted at trial without violating right to fair trial).
255. See AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 18 (1999) (stating because the Working Group did
not debate the meaning of "mental suffering," it is still unclear).
256. See id. at 18 (providing examples of state proposals defining torture).
Portugal proposed the inclusion of the use of psychiatry in the definition of torture,
while Barbados has suggested that the definition of mental suffering should be
expanded to include sophisticated weapons of torture like truth drugs which do not
produce apparent physical or mental suffering. Id. at 19.
257. See OLC MEMO, supra note 127, at 22 (citing BURGERS & DANELIUS,
supra note 67, commonly considered the main source of the travaux preparatoires
for CAT).
258. See id. at 22 (construing states' rejection of the CAT proposal of including
the use of truth drugs as torture, as an indicator that these states did not view the
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expanded to cover the use of truth drugs regardless of mental or
physical pain.259 The failure to adopt this proposal does not indicate
that the use of "truth drugs" falls outside the definition of torture.
The failure to include the proposed language could be the result of a
decision to omit a list of prohibited acts for fear that the list would be
seen as exhaustive. For example, the definition of torture in CAT
does not expressly ban medical or scientific experiments on
unwilling subjects for no therapeutic purpose, as an earlier human
rights treaty had done. 260 But this does not mean that such
experiments are allowed under CAT. Rather, they would constitute
torture when they result in "severe pain or suffering. '26' Thus, the
involuntary administration of truth serum could also amount to
torture when it results in severe mental pain or suffering.
There is no extensive discussion in the negotiating history of the
definition of "severe. '262 Torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment did not become two separate categories until CAT. The
pre-CAT Declaration Against Torture had defined torture as an
"aggravated and deliberate" form of CIDT; 263 in other words, the
Declaration Against Torture considered torture one type of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The reference to
torture as a particularly aggravated and deliberate form of CIDT in
the Declaration Against Torture supports the argument that torture
must be exponentially more extreme and severe as compared to
use of truth drugs as torture per se); see also Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 249-50
(claiming failure to adopt Barbados' proposal indicates that the use of truth serum
is not torture). The Revised OLC Memo does not address the travaux
preparatoires. Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156 (replacing original OLC
Memo).
259. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 45 (describing proposal of
Barbados).
260. See id. at 118 (citing Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
261. See id. (explaining the failure of CAT to ban medical or scientific
experiments does not exclude them from torture where there is severe pain or
suffering).
262. BOULESBAA, supra note 255, at 17 (stating the Working Group discussed
only briefly what constitutes "severe" and in their Commentaries, states did not
address the issue).
263. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at 389 (Annex 1) (defining torture as
something that "constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment").
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CIDT.26" However, the "aggravated and deliberate" language was
rejected in drafting CAT; language referring to acts "which are not
sufficient to constitute torture" was also rejected.265 Instead, CAT's
Article 16 on CIDT refers to "other acts of [CIDT] which do not
amount to torture .... .. 266 Thus, it is not clear how much more
"extreme" an act must be to constitute torture, although there is a
clear implication that torture is the "gravest form" of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.267
The OLC contends that the ratification history of CAT shows that
only the most extreme conduct will rise to the level of torture; in
other words, "severe" is a very high threshold to meet.268 The use of
the term "severe" implies that "only acts of a certain gravity shall be
considered torture. 2 69 Moreover, the OLC contends that the
negotiating history of CAT also supports this reading: torture must
be more than cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
it must be deliberate and extreme pain.270 According to the United
264. See id. (supporting the argument that torture and CIDT are different
gradations of the same idea).
265. See id. at 99 (articulating the "aggravated and deliberate" language was
subjected to criticism from the beginning because CIDT was at the time undefined
and might be interpreted differently in different parts of the world).
266. Id. (noting the deletion was probably made in order to expedite the process
by way of compromise).
267. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 80 (emphasizing the change
from "which do not constitute torture" to "which do not amount to torture"
indicates that torture is the gravest form of CIDT).
268. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 16-20 (discussing the position of the
Reagan and Bush administrations on ratification); see also Revised OLC Memo,
supra note 156, at 6 (describing torture as an extreme form of CIDT).
269. BURGERS & DANEL1US, supra note 67, at 117 (stating alternative wordings
such as "extreme" or "extremely severe" pain were suggested during the travaux
preparatoires).
270. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 21 (noting that almost all of the
suggested definitions of torture illustrate the consensus that torture is an extreme
act designed to cause agonizing pain). But see Revised OLC Memo, supra note
156, at 8 n. 17 (refraining from requiring "excruciating and agonizing pain" based
on distinction between accepted RUDs and proposed Reagan understanding to
Article 1). See discussion infra notes 278-281 and accompanying text (discussing
distinction between the proposed and accepted RUDs).
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States, "the negotiating history should also reflect the requisite
intensity and severity inherent in torture. 271
Yet the negotiating history shows that the Working Group did not
adopt the U.S.-proposed "deliberate and extreme" language, or its
equivalent.272 As part of the Working Group drafting CAT, the
United States proposed that the definition of torture include
deliberate and extreme infliction of pain: "any act by which
extremely severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
deliberately and maliciously inflicted on a person .... ",273 The U.S.
also proposed use of the phrase "deliberately and maliciously" in
place of a list of purposes.27 4 The Working Group did not adopt the
U.S. proposal to include a "deliberate and malicious" component.275
Moreover, it did not adopt the proposed language of "extremely
severe."
276
The "extreme" language was again proposed and rejected when
the U.S. Senate ratified CAT with a package of RUDs.277 Although
the Reagan Administration attempted to broaden the severity
language via the RUDs, the Senate did not adopt the proposed
Reagan understanding to Article 1.278 The Reagan Administration
proposed that torture "must be a deliberate and calculated act of an
extremely cruel and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict
271. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 44-45 (discussing that with regard
to the character of the act constituting torture, the United States indicated that the
results of the act were not determinative, but rather the severity of the act).
272. See id. at 41 (describing U.S. insistence on focusing on torture rather than
on other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
273. Id. (emphasis added) (explaining some governments had submitted
alternatives to the original Swedish draft proposal, especially with regard to the
definition of torture).
274. Id. at 46.
275. Id. at41.
276. CAT, supra note 30 (providing torture must cause "severe" pain or
suffering).
277. See Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 8 (highlighting that the
proposal to include only acts of an "extremely cruel nature, causing excruciating
and agonizing pain" was not adopted as an understanding).
278. See id. at 18 (explaining the Senate did not give its advice and consent to
the Convention until the first Bush Administration, using less vigorous language).
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excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering. 279
The Senate criticized this language for "setting too high a threshold
of pain for an act to constitute torture,' 28 ° and the first Bush
Administration dropped the language in favor of the understanding
discussed in Part II.B.1. As the State Department explained, the
revised understanding would not raise the threshold of pain already
required under CAT,28 ' indicating that the Reagan understanding
would have altered the definition of torture under CAT. Thus, while
severity is required, the travaux preparatoires of CAT and the
legislative record regarding U.S. ratification indicate that the severity
requirement should not be overstated.2 82
The OLC would presumably argue that the use of truth serum does
not cause "severe" mental pain or suffering amounting to torture,
even under a more limited understanding of "severe." In interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 2340A, criminalizing torture abroad, the OLC offers
arguments relevant to the interpretation of CAT. Relying on
dictionary definitions, the OLC contends that "severe pain or
suffering" means that "pain or suffering must be of such a high level
of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure. '283 The
Revised OLC Memo quotes the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
report: "The term 'torture,' in the United States and international
usage, is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel
279. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, S. ExEc. REP. No. 101-30, at 15 (1990) (noting the understandings
included are to protect against the improper application of the Convention to
legitimate U.S. law enforcement actions).
280. Id. at 9 (specifying the language of the Reagan Administration's proposed
understanding and the Senate criticism of it).
281. Id. at app. A, Bush Administration Reservations, Understandings And
Declarations, As Transmitted: Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Asst. Secretary,
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to Senator Pell, Dec. 10, 1989 (assuring
the package now contains a revised understanding to the definition of torture).
282. See id. at 9 (explaining rejection of the Reagan Administration's proposed
language because it set too high a threshold for an act to constitute torture).
283. OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 5 (supplying the dictionary definition of
severe as "unsparing in exaction, punishment, or censure" or "inflicting discomfort
or pain hard to endure; sharp; afflictive; distressing; violent; extreme; as severe
pain, anguish, torture"); see Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 5 (continuing
reliance on dictionary definition of severe, including "extreme" and "hard to
sustain or endure").
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practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of
electrical currents to sensitive parts of the body, or tying up or
hanging in positions that cause extreme pain. 2 84 These examples of
severe pain or suffering, however, are not applicable to mental pain
or suffering.
Even if the examples of "severe" pain are inapposite when
considering mental pain, the OLC would likely contend that truth
serum would nonetheless fail to inflict severe mental pain or
suffering.285 The OLC asserts that international decisions have
determined various aggressive interrogation methods to be CIDT,
rather than torture.286 For example, the European Court of Human
Rights found that relatively sophisticated methods (the "five
techniques") employed to break suspected IRA terrorists constitute
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment but not torture.287 According
to the OLC, "even though the court had concluded that the
techniques produce 'intense physical and mental suffering' and
'acute psychiatric disturbances,' they were not [of] sufficient
intensity or cruelty to amount to torture. 288
284. Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 6 (revising the original OLC
Memo that argued that 'severe pain,' as used in Section 2340, must rise to a
similarly high level-the level that would ordinarily be associated with a
sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure or
serious impairment of bodily functions-in order to constitute torture."); see OLC
Memo, supra note 127, at 5-6 (referring to statutes that use the term "severe pain"
to define an emergency medical condition). The original reliance on this very
narrow interpretation of "severe" has been abandoned. See Revised OLC Memo,
supra note 156, at 8 n.17 ("We do not believe that [statutes defining 'emergency
medical condition' for purpose of determining health benefits] provide a proper
guide for interpreting 'severe pain' in the very different context of the prohibition
against torture. .. ").
285. See OLC memo, supra note 127, at 7 (explaining decisions by the
European Court of Human Rights and the Israeli Supreme Court have supported
the position that aggressive interrogation techniques were at most CIDT).
286. See id. at 27 (contending that these decisions reinforce the view that there is
a clear distinction between the two standards and that only extreme conduct will
constitute torture as opposed to CIDT); see also Revised OLC Memo, supra note
156, at 6 n. 14 (reiterating distinction between torture and CIDT).
287. See id. at 28-29 (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom in illustrating that "five
techniques" include wall-standing, hooding, noise, sleep deprivation and
deprivation of food and drink)
288. OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 29 (stating the European Court of Human
Rights reached this conclusion based on the distinction between torture and CIDT);
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The OLC ignores that fact that critics have characterized this
decision as erroneous and likely politically motivated.28 9 Even a
member of the European Court of Human Rights accused the
majority of bias in his separate opinion concluding that the five
techniques constitute torture.29° Judge O'Donoghue asserted that the
court abused the margin of appreciation, a doctrine that gives leeway
to states to act during emergencies. 2 91 He charged the majority with
using the principle in favor of the United Kingdom "as a blanket
exculpation for many actions taken which cannot be reconciled with
observance of the obligations imposed by the Convention. 292 He
subsequently accused the court of departing from "cold
objectivity. 293 Moreover, the Court may have been influenced by the
United Kingdom's abandonment of the five techniques and its
"solemn and unqualified undertaking not to reintroduce these
techniques.., and the other measures taken by the United Kingdom
to remedy, impose punishment for, and prevent the recurrence of, the
see Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 6 n.14 (citing Ireland v. United
Kingdom in explaining the distinction between torture and lesser forms of CIDT).
The OLC Memo also relied on Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment Concerning the
Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods of Sept. 6, 1999,
Motion for an Order Nisi, H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999),
available at http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2005) because the court never found the use of "moderate physical pressure" to
constitute torture, even while noting that such a conclusion was unnecessary
because the court banned the techniques as unauthorized. OLC Memo, supra note
127, at 30.
289. See, e.g., Julie Lantrip, Torture and Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 5
ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 551, 560 (1999) (describing Ireland v. United
Kingdom as a "ground-breaking, although criticized" case); see Rhonda Copelon,
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 291, 320 (1994) (depicting Ireland v. United Kingdom
decision of European Court as "widely criticized").
290. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (ser. A) (separate opinion of
Judge O'Donoghue) (1978); 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (1979-80).
291. See id. (noting he is a "firm upholder" of the doctrine that a margin of
appreciation should be extended to a state acting in an emergency, but that this
went too far).
292. Id. (referring to facts of wall-standing, hooding, and sleep and food
deprivation as outside the bounds of actions that a state may take in an
emergency).
293. Id. (citing passages of the majority's judgment as illustrative examples of
this departure).
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various violations found by the Commission [on Human Rights,
whose report the European Court was reviewing]. 294
The Revised OLC Memo relies on judicial interpretations of civil
statutes for torture295 to illustrate the minimum threshold for "severe"
pain or suffering. For example, in Simpson v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,296 the court held that the plaintiff had failed
to state a claim for torture where she alleged that she was forcibly
removed from a cruise ship that had taken shelter in a Libyan port,
threatened with death and separated from her husband for months
before her release. 97 The court concluded that "[a]lthough these
alleged acts certainly reflect a bent toward cruelty on the part of their
perpetrators, they are not in themselves so unusually cruel or
sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to constitute torture .... "298
The court offers no explanation of its reasoning.
The Revised OLC Memo also relies on Price v. Socialist People 's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Price //),299 where allegations of beatings
without details of severity, timing, duration, location on body, and
weapons were insufficient to allege "torture. ' 3°° In Price II, however,
the court emphasized that the complaint "is simply too conclusory"
and remanded the case so that plaintiffs could amend the
294. Id. 152 (discussing the fact that the United Kingdom did not contest its
breaches of Article 3 of the Convention or the Court's jurisdiction to examine such
breaches).
295. See Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992,
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)) (allowing
U.S. citizens and aliens to seek damages for torture or extrajudicial killings but
limiting its jurisdiction to acts committed by those acting under the authority of
foreign nations); see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1605(a)(7), P.L. No
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976), codified as amended at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1391(b),
1441(d), 1602-11 (2000) (removing immunity of state sponsors of terrorism for
acts such as torture and hostage-taking).
296. 326 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
297. See id. at 232 (holding plaintiff failed to state a claim for torture or hostage-
taking and remanding to allow opportunity to amend complaint).
298. Id. at 234 (reversing claim for torture under Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act).
299. See 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that allegations fail to state a
claim for torture or hostage-taking).
300. See Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 9 (citing Price II).
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complaint.301 Because the complaint alleged "no useful details" about
the nature of the alleged physical abuse, the court could not
determine severity.302 The court indicated that the beatings might
constitute torture, but that the conclusory pleadings do not
demonstrate intense pain or suffering.303 Thus, based on Price II, a
mere allegation of forced administration of truth serum would be
insufficient to allege torture due to lack of severity, but the case does
not foreclose the possibility that a well-pleaded complaint could
satisfy the severity requirement.
One could argue, however, that the effects of a drug pale in
comparison to mock execution or mental pain arising from
witnessing the physical torture of another, for example, being forced
to witness a wife or child being raped or killed.3° At first glance,
these acts seem more horrible than an injection of truth serum. But
deeper analysis will reveal that the infliction of hostile mind control
might cause severe harm. Other acts that have been generally
recognized as inflicting severe mental pain or suffering include:
(1) acts that imply threats or create fear in the victim (e.g., making
the victim believe he or family members will be killed if he fails to
cooperate);30 5 (2) forcing a victim to witness horrifying acts (e.g.,
301. See Price II, 294 F.3d at 85, 94 (remanding to allow plaintiffs to attempt to
amend complaint to satisfy stringent definition of torture).
302. See id. at 94 (adding the complaint also stated nothing about the purpose of
the alleged torture).
303. See id. (also determining that the complaint failed to satisfy the requirement
of purpose, leaving it to the court to "conjure some illicit purpose").
304. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1(a) (defining mental pain
or suffering as prolonged mental harm resulting from the infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering, the administration or threatened
administration of mind altering drugs, the threat of imminent death, or the threat
that another person will imminently be subjected to these acts). This language does
not explicitly refer to mental pain caused by witnessing the act on another person,
as opposed to the threat of such an act. Id. But it is clear that witnessing these acts
might result in or cause such mental pain. See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d
1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding mental torture based on witnessing the infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering of a close friend). Similarly, the CAT definition
of torture does not explicitly include witnessing such acts or even threats.
Nevertheless, both threats of imminent abuse and witnessing abuse have often
formed the basis for torture. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 118
(torture includes acts that imply threats or force witnessing of abuse).
305. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 118 (explaining that the kinds
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execution or torture of others);30 6 and (3) deprivation of basic needs
of a person (e.g., deprivation of food, water, or sleep).307
The U.S. courts have recognized that these types of acts can rise to
the level of mental torture. For example, the allegations in the
revised complaint in Price III satisfied the severity requirement via
allegations of both physical and mental torture.30 8 In addition to
detailed allegations of physical abuse, the plaintiffs alleged mental
pain or suffering, specifically, that prison officials forced them to
watch beatings of other prisoners on three separate occasions and
told them that they would receive the same treatment if they did not
confess. 09 The court determined that these allegations satisfied the
"high standards" for a claim of mental torture.310 In another civil case
involving torture, Doe v. Qi,311 the court found severe mental pain or
suffering where an individual alleged that Chinese authorities forced
her to watch the sexual assault of a close friend.3"2 Like mental
anguish resulting from another person's suffering, mental anguish
from truth serum could rise to the level of severe mental pain or
of acts inflicting severe mental pain can be very different).
306. See id. (supplying as an example the act of forcing an individual to witness
execution or torture of other detainees or his own family members).
307. See id. (explaining that in all of these cases, the pain or suffering has to be
severe in order for the act to constitute torture).
308. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2003), aff'd, 389 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Price III) (holding that
plaintiffs' allegations state a claim for mental torture under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, which gives victims of state-sponsored torture a cause of action
against the state).
309. See id. at 25 (specifying one Tunisian prisoner was beaten even after he lost
consciousness, one Libyan journalist was beaten, and one prisoner was beaten with
truncheons and a hammer because he had shared food, which he had received from
his friends or relatives, with the plaintiffs).
310. Id. (alleging further that approximately two days after being forced to
watch other prisoners' beating, plaintiffs were interrogated by three prosecutors,
and informed they had one last chance to sign confessions admitting they were
spies).
311. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding certain Chinese officials
responsible for torture and arbitrary detention of some plaintiffs and entering
default judgment on those claims).
312. See id. at 1318 (finding that the alleged acts rise to the level of torture
under the Torture Victims Protection Act [substantially similar to CAT's
definition]).
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suffering.3 13 Mental pain creates a sense that the pain is self-inflicted,
intensifying the suffering.3 4 The hostile use of truth serum might
well be extreme enough to constitute severe mental pain or suffering,
particularly when the U.S. interpretation of "mental pain" is
controlling.
2. Severe Mental Pain as Modified by the United States
The United States provided its own standard for mental pain or
suffering in its RUDs to CAT. The understanding to the definition of
torture provides in pertinent part: "mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from . . . the
administration, application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality ... 315
Thus, according to the U.S. definition of mental pain or suffering,
psychological pain or suffering resulting from a mind altering
substance such as truth serum and causing long-term mental harm
would constitute torture.
The United States adopted this understanding in order to provide
the constitutionally-required precision necessary for criminal
offenses.316 The Department of Justice asserted that an understanding
was necessary due to the lack of a consensus or coherent body of
313. Compare E.V. Kontorovich, Make Them Talk: truth serum ought to be a
weapon in our antiterror arsenal, WALL. ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A16 (arguing
truth serum is not brutal and is more properly treated as a search than as torture);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LEGAL PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE (stating
truth serum "does not involve the infliction of severe pain" but is prohibited under
international law), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/TortureQandA.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005); AMNESTY INT'L, MEMO TO THE US ATTORNEY GEN. - Al's
CONCERNS RELATING TO THE POST 11 SEPT INVESTIGATIONS, Al Index AMR
51/170/2001, at 17-18 (equating truth serum with CIDT rather than torture),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511702001 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005), with Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 238 n.146 (citing Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International as commentators who argue that truth serum is
torture).
314. See Copelon, supra note 289, at 313 (observing some of the most insidious
forms of torture are ones that do not involve brutality at all).
315. U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (emphasis added).
316. See INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 122, 95
(explaining that a precise definition of torture is required in order for such crimes
to be enforceable under the U.S. Constitution).
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international law concerning the requisite degree of mental pain or
suffering. 17 The Department described the understanding as one that
"condemns as torture intentional acts such as those designed to
damage and destroy the human personality .... According to the
State Department, it does not raise the threshold of pain required for
torture under international law.3 9
It will be shown that truth serum causes prolonged mental harm
and is a mind altering substance. The core of a person-her own
mind, her beliefs, thoughts, judgment-is negated when under the
influence of an effective truth serum. The significance of this loss
results in significant mental pain or suffering. Truth serum invades
the mind in a profoundly disturbing way, and its absolute control
over the mind and personality during the session might be compared
to a physical invasion: truth serum as the equivalent to mental rape,
leading to prolonged mental harm.
a. Proof of Prolonged Mental Harm
In order to prove severe pain or suffering, the mental harm must
be prolonged.320 The requirement of "prolonged" mental harm is
apparently an American addition, not discussed in the travaux
317. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 17 (1990) (insisting the understanding
was necessary in order to satisfy individual due process under the U.S.
Constitution).
318. Id. (quoting the U.S. understanding of the definition of torture as mental
suffering). But see id. at 73 (Statement of Charles Rice, Professor of Law, Notre
Dame Law School, criticizing the ambiguous meaning of mental pain
understanding, specifically "other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality").
319. See id. at 10 (maintaining U.S. reservations to CAT merely specify its
obligations without modifying them).
320. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (recognizing that, under
the language of the understanding, prolonged mental harm can stem from the
administration or threatened administration of mind altering drugs or "other
procedures"). The reference to "other procedures" is not applicable here, because
the use of truth serum by definition equates to the administration of a (potentially
mind altering) substance; hence, there is no need to look at "other procedures." Id.
The analysis will therefore begin with "prolonged mental harm" and then examine
the administration or threatened administration of truth serum in a preventive
interrogational context. Id.
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preparatoires.321  Nonetheless, it is not a problematic addition
because no reasonable interpreter of the torture definition would
assert that fleeting pain is sufficient. Moreover, the United States
recently recognized that harm "need not be permanent," based on the
negotiating history of CAT.3 22 The United States "considered that it
might be useful to develop the negotiating history which indicates
that although conduct resulting in permanent impairment of physical
or mental faculties is indicative of torture, it is not an essential
element of the offence." '323 Thus, mental harm must be more than
momentary or fleeting but need not be permanent.324
The OLC asserts that "prolonged" means harm "endured over
some period of time" or causing "lasting" damage.325 The OLC
initially contended that pain or suffering must result in "significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or
even years. 326 Specifically, "the development of a mental disorder
such as posttraumatic stress disorder, which can last months or even
years, or even chronic depression, which also can last for a
considerable period of time if untreated, might satisfy the prolonged
harm requirement. 3 27 More recently, the OLC revised its position to
drop the requirement of months or years.3 28 Development of mental
321. See generally BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67 (noting the extensive
description of the various working groups drafting CAT contains no reference to
"prolonged" pain or suffering).
322. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 21 (stating permanent harm from the
acts of torture is not essential to prove a violation of CAT).
323. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 44.
324. See id. at 20 (requiring mental suffering be of a significant duration but not
permanent).
325. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 7 (relying on dictionary definition since
"'prolonged mental harm' appears nowhere else in the U.S. Code nor does it
appear in relevant medical literature or international human rights reports"); see
also Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 14 (relying on similar dictionary
definitions).
326. Id. at 1 (providing a standard for the length of time one much experience
psychological pain or suffering to qualify as torture).
327. Id. at 7 (describing two possible mental disorders that could satisfy the
prolonged mental suffering requirement); see Revised OLC Memo, supra note
156, at 14 n.25 (agreeing development of mental disorder such as PTSD or chronic
depression, among other causes, could cause prolonged mental harm).
328. See Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 14 n.24 (discussing first OLC
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disorders can constitute prolonged mental harm "of some lasting
duration" short of months.329
Many scenarios can be imagined where the hostile use of
interrogational truth serum would cause Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder ("PTSD").330 For example, think of a high level FBI agent
who knows of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell in the United States that is
planning a future attack on a large U.S. city. Before the government
can take action, Al Qaeda kidnaps the agent and injects truth serum.
The agent reveals the government's plan to arrest the cell and thwart
its attack. The Al Qaeda members flee, leaving the agent behind,
alive but unable to immediately escape. Armed with the knowledge
gained from the use of truth serum, the cell evades arrest and
immediately detonates a dirty bomb at the Sears Tower in Chicago.
Tens of thousands are killed and maimed through shrapnel, radiation,
and the resulting panic. The contamination shuts down the city,
throwing the nation's economy into a tailspin. The agent breaks out
of his place of captivity, only to learn of the devastation and
destruction caused by his words. His coerced confession led to the
deaths of thousands of innocent people. Thousands of others will die
a slow and horrible death from radiation poisoning. The agent will
suffer significant emotional trauma from both the hostile mind
control and the horrific results of his inability to withhold the
information. Given the harm that his words have caused, the
emotional trauma is likely to result in PTSD or similar mental harm.
PTSD can be triggered by a variety of traumas. The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) provides
examples of many different types of traumatic events that can trigger
PTSD.33 1 These include the direct experience of torture, incarceration
memo requirement of months or years).
329. See id. (stating mental harm must be of some lasting duration, but
disagreeing with suggestion that mental harm must endure at least months or
years).
330. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 21 (recognizing PTSD as a possible
condition that could satisfy the U.S. requirement that the torturous act cause
prolonged harm); see also Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 14 n.25
(agreeing development of mental disorder such as PTSD could constitute
prolonged mental harm, although not limiting it to such cases).
331. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERs 463-
64 (1994).
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as a prisoner of war, and violent physical assault.332 PTSD can also
be the result of experiences that happened to others such as learning
about the serious injury of a close friend or family member or a
child's life-threatening disease.333 If PTSD can be caused by these
more attenuated events, the direct experience of the agent described
above might cause PTSD as well.
PTSD, moreover, is "especially severe or long lasting when the
stressor is of human design (e.g., torture, rape). 334 The effects of
truth serum might be considered mental rape-the wholesale
invasion and control of the mind against the will of the individual.
Physical rape is associated with "very high rates" of PTSD.335 "It
would generally be accepted that this [high rate] is not surprising
because a priori reasoning suggests that rape is a very specific
stressor which involves an extreme threat to the person, an invasion,
a loss of control, and a feeling of helplessness. 336 The mind control
inherent in truth serum could be seen as a similar invasion, leading to
a total loss of control and extreme feeling of helplessness. 37
Obviously, the physical invasion of rape is far worse than the needle
prick envisioned as the only physical effect of truth serum.338 But
even when rape does not involve an "overt threat of violence, the
extent of personal invasion, helplessness and assault is great."339
Thus, the purely mental assault of truth serum would result in a sense
332. See id. (supplying examples of traumatic events that could trigger PTSD).
333. See id. (stating whether the triggering event happens to oneself or others,
the person's response to the event has to involve a sense of fear, helplessness, or
horror).
334. Id. (observing the likelihood of developing PTSD increases where the
stress related object is closer in proximity to the subject).
335. L. STEPHEN O'BRIEN, TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH 131
(1998).
336. Id.
337. Cf Jessica Pae, Note, The Emasculation of Compelled Testimony: Battling
the Effects of Judicially Imposed Limitations On Grand Jury Investigations of
Terrorism and Other Ideological Crimes, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 473, 505-06 (1997)
(noting subjects under the effect of truth serums distort reality and have less
control over their thoughts and expressions than subjects under hypnosis).
338. See discussion infra Part I.B (positing effects of next-generation truth
serum).
339. O'BRIEN, supra note 335, at 131-32.
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of personal invasion and helplessness so vast that it results in
prolonged mental harm such as PTSD.
Even if mental harm from interrogational truth serum does not rise
to the level of PTSD, it meets the lesser forms of prolonged mental
harm described by the OLC. For example, the OLC favorably cites
case law finding that long-term, ongoing harm constitutes severe
mental harm.340 The symptoms of severe mental harm included
anxiety, flashbacks, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, depression,
nervousness, irritability, and difficulty trusting people.3 4' Being a
victim of mind control will likely cause ongoing mental trauma such
as anxiety, difficulty trusting people, nightmares and/or depression.
The law enforcement agent who involuntarily aided a terrorist attack
is likely to feel a sense of anguish, guilt, and failure for the rest of
her life. At the least, it will cause difficulty sleeping, anxiety, and
irritability.342 The effects of having another person take over your
mind and completely override your will, as in the example of coerced
cooperation with terrorists,3 43 are likely to cause profound psychic
pain. Such anguish would inflict PTSD or at least mental harm such
as anxiety or depression. The sense of invasion and helplessness is
likely to echo for many months if not years, supporting that it is not
only "prolonged" but also "severe."
340. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 24 (citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198
F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1334, 1336, 1337-8, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2002), to illustrate severe
mental pain can come from threats of severe physical pain and of imminent death);
see also Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 15 (citing Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1334, 1336, 1337-8, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2002), as an
example of mental pain).
341. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 26; see also Revised OLC Memo,
supra note 156, at 15. But see Villeda v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, 305 F. Supp.
2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding insufficient evidence of lasting damage where no
allegations of prolonged harm; court characterized being held at gunpoint
overnight and repeatedly threatened with death as "eight-hour aggravated assault"
rather than torture), cited in Revised OLC Memo, note 156, at 15.
342. Cf Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(noting the plaintiff in the case suffered physical and emotional harms years after
the traumatic event). But see Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 253 (asserting truth
serum's effect is confined to the period of administration and that there is little
reason to believe truth serum causes prolonged harm).
343. See discussion supra text accompanying note 338 (describing hypothetical
use of truth serum by terrorists on captured U.S. law enforcement official).
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b. Truth Serum as a Mind Altering Substance
Furthermore, the United States seems to have opened the door to
equating truth serum with torture by its understanding, which defines
mental harm in terms of mind altering substances.3" It will be shown
that in addition to causing severe pain or suffering in the form of
prolonged mental harm, preventive interrogational truth serum is also
a mind altering substance that disrupts the senses or personality.345
By definition, truth serum alters the mind, interfering with cognitive
ability.346 It therefore falls under the U.S. interpretation of mental
harm.
Indeed, it is possible that a desire to prohibit truth serum was the
impetus behind the inclusion of the "mind altering" language. The
intelligence community was aware that other countries were
attempting to produce "truth serum" and feared its use on U.S.
citizens. 347 For example, the Director of Central Intelligence
indicated as far back as 1977 that other countries might use mind
altering drugs and "relaxants that make tongues looser than they
would otherwise be. ' 348 But there was also a specific fear of the use
of LSD on captured Americans.349 It is not clear whether the potential
hostile use of truth serum or other drugs prompted this
344. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (defining mental harm
in terms of administration or threatened administration of "mind altering drugs").
345. See discussion infra notes 357-368 and accompanying text (using OLC
Memo and other definitions of "mind altering" substance to assess truth serum).
346. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (characterizing "truth
serum" as a substance that is used to induce a subject to talk freely), at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va-truth+serum (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005). "Cognition" is identified as including awareness and
judgment. Id. at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=cognition (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
347. See Joint Hearing, supra note 28 (statement of Director of Central
Intelligence, Adm. Turner) (expressing the director's concern that U.S. prisoners of
war were being administered truth serum by foreign operatives).
348. See id. at 44 (recognizing U.S. prisoners of war in Korea were likely
administered some form of chemical agent that resembles truth serum).
349. See id. at 43 (noting although the CIA has no files to prove the assertion, it
strongly contends that other countries have used LSD against U.S. citizens).
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understanding.3 50 Regardless, truth serum would fall under its terms
because it disrupts the senses or personality.
According to the OLC, "The phrase 'mind altering substances' is
found nowhere else in the U.S. Code, nor is it found in dictionaries,
but it is often used in case law as a synonym for drugs."35' The OLC
cites state statutes to further support this position, although the
examples given equate mind altering substances with both
psychotropic drugs and alcohol.352 In the U.S. understanding, the
phrase "mind altering substances" is paired with "other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality. 353
Thus, a mind altering substance is not simply a drug, but a drug
calculated to significantly disrupt the senses or personality.
The OLC posits that the following would profoundly disrupt the
senses or personality: drug-induced dementia (significant memory
impairment along with loss or impairment of language function,
motor function or abstract thinking); onset of "brief psychotic
disorder" (delusions, hallucinations, catatonic state); onset of
obsessive-compulsive disorder; and pushing to brink of suicide.354
The consequences of truth serum might well push the subject to the
brink of suicide, particularly in the FBI agent scenario described
above. Even if it does not, it would likely be on par with obsessive-
compulsive disorder as defined by the OLC (time-consuming
350. See Senate CAT, supra note 317 (containing no mention of truth drugs or
truth serum within transcripts of hearings or letters, but referred to in attachments).
Excerpts of M. Cherif Bassiouni's "An Appraisal of Torture in International Law
and Practice: The Need for an International Convention for the Prevention and
Suppression of Torture" are attached to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Hearings on the CAT. Id. at 143-44. In the excerpt, Bassiouni describes
psychological methods used to produce severe pain or suffering including
"straightforward, even non-painful, [drugs] such as various truth drugs." Id. There
are no indications, however, that this detail was noted by those voting to ratify
CAT.
351. OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 9 (listing various cases where drugs were
recognized as mind altering substances). The Revised OLC Memo does not
address this issue. Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156.
352. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 10 (providing various state statutes that
support the proposition that mind altering substances are drugs and alcohol).
353. U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1.
354. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 11 (listing examples that would
constitute a profound disruption of the personality since the phrase is not found in
any U.S. law).
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repetitive behavior plus obsession).355 Moreover, this list is not
exhaustive.356
"The phrase 'disrupt profoundly the senses or personality' is not
used in mental health literature nor is it derived from elsewhere in
U.S. law. '3 57 Relying on dictionary definitions of "disrupt" and
"profound," the OLC determines that a drug "calculated to disrupt
profoundly" must be designed to have a deep and extreme effect on
the subject.358 Interrogational truth serum "must penetrate to the core
of an individual's ability to perceive the world around him,
substantially interfering with his cognitive abilities, or fundamentally
alter his personality. 359
Truth serum, by definition, would substantially interfere with the
unwilling subject's cognitive abilities. Cognition is "the act or
process of knowing including both awareness and judgment. 36 °
Truth serum would wipe out the subject's judgment, rendering him
incapable of silence or subterfuge. 361 An effective truth serum would
block his ability to censor his answers.362 It would negate his ability
355. See id. (noting examples of obsessive-compulsive disorder such as
compulsive repetitive behaviors).
356. See id. (characterizing obsessions as intrusive thoughts unrelated to reality).
357. Id. (adding that the phrase "mind altering substances" also does not appear
in any dictionary or anywhere within the U.S. Code but acts as a common
synonym for "drugs").
358. See id. at 10-11 (comparing the effect to a drug-induced dementia where
the subject suffers from severe memory destruction).
359. Id. (describing, as an example, an individual's inability to retain new
information or remember information he previously was interested in); see also
Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 252 (contending there is a convincing argument that
truth serum profoundly disrupts the senses based on impairment of sense of time,
memory and awareness while under truth serum).
360. MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (supplying the accepted
definitions of the word "cognition"), at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=cognition&x=0&y=0 (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
361. See THE FREE DICTIONARY.COM (explaining certain truth serums interfere
with a subj ect's higher cognition), at
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Truth%20serum (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
362. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (defining truth serum as a
substance that induces a subject to "talk feely" while under questioning), at
http://63.240.197.90/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va--truth+serum (last
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to think of ways to elude the question by lying or refusing to answer.
This state would likely lead to cognitive dissonance, the
"psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and
attitudes held simultaneously. ' 36 3 The subject would suffer from the
contradiction between his desire to refuse to provide information and
his compelled cooperation with interrogators. 64
This interference with cognitive abilities is sufficient under the
U.S. understanding of mental harm. But preventive interrogational
truth serum would also fundamentally alter the subject's personality
by transforming him into an automaton who must answer the
question put to him.365 His personality would be radically altered by
the act of divulging information he wishes to keep secret.36 His real
personality would be virtually wiped out during the session, and
significantly affected afterward. 367 Personality cannot be divorced
from beliefs; the interrogational truth serum session, by design,
visited Apr. 2, 2005); see also discussion supra Part L.A (positing "next-
generation" truth serum).
363. Cf id. (defining "cognitive dissonance" as a psychological conflict), at
http://63.240.197.90/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=cognitive+dissonance&x = 13&y=8 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
364. See Anupama Katakam, The Truth Serum Trial, FRONTLINE, Mar. 12, 2004
(describing the effects of truth serum on Abdul Karim Telgi, the mastermind
behind the stamp paper scam in India); see also discussion supra Part L.A (positing
that subjects under effective truth serum are forced to divulge information upon
interrogation).
365. See id. (noting that, according to Indian Government sources, Mr. Telgi
"sang like a canary" while under the effects of the serum); see also discussion
supra Part L.A (describing inability to remain silent under effective truth serum).
366. See id. (stating Mr. Telgi divulged secrets such as who he had monetary
transactions with, places he operated, bank accounts, and business associates); see
also discussion supra Part I.B (describing a truth serum that lives up to its name);
Part IV.A.2.a (discussing potential effects of hostile use of truth serum on law
enforcement officer by terrorists).
367. See discussion supra Part L.A (illustrating effects of next-generation truth
serum); see also Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 252 (asserting personality of
individual under truth serum "may well undergo profound alteration"); NICHOLAS
SAUNDERS, E FOR ECSTASY 4 (1993) (presenting the potential after effect hazards
of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), a drug once tested as a truth
serum), available at http://blackroses.textfiles.com/drugs/e4xtca.txt (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
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forces the subject to betray his belief system.36s For example,
consider the highly trained law enforcement officer who is rendered
helpless, unable to stanch the flow of words involuntarily aiding the
enemy. How could his cognitive abilities not be "interfered with"
when he has lost control of his own mind and been forced to betray
his beliefs and his country? How could his personality-his very
sense of self-not be profoundly affected? Truth serum, therefore, is
a mind altering substance calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or personality.
c. Threatened Administration of Mind Altering Drugs
Similarly, the threat of using truth serum results in prolonged
mental harm, thereby satisfying the U.S. interpretation of severe
mental pain or suffering. 369 Under the U.S. understanding, mental
harm includes "threatened administration or application" of mind
altering substances. 370 The fear of involuntary interrogational truth
serum could cause similar effects as its use.
Although the OLC did not discuss threatened use of mind altering
substances, it analyzed "threat" with regard to other forms of mental
harm.37' It favorably cites Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, a case involving
severe mental pain due to the threat of severe physical pain and
imminent death.372 The OLC determined that an explicit or implicit
368. See MARTIN LEE & BRUCE SHLAIN, ACID DREAMS THE CIA, LSD AND THE
SIXTIES REBELLION 23 (1985) (discussing the CIA's interest in LSD because of the
drug's ability to suspend a subject's belief system), available at
http://www.wardrobe.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/texts/1189/aciddrms.txt (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
369. See discussion supra Part IV.2 (describing the standard used by the United
States in interpreting what constitutes "severe mental pain or suffering").
370. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (defining severe mental
pain or suffering as, inter alia, prolonged mental harm caused by administration or
threatened administration of mind altering substances).
371. See id. (addressing the first predicate act in the mental harm understanding:
"prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (a) the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering .... ). The Revised OLC
Memo does not address this issue, although it does favorably cite the same case as
the first memo as an example of extreme conduct, which constitutes torture. See
generally Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 10 (citing Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic to establish acts such as limiting water and food, cutting figures into a
subject's forehead, and hanging and beating as torture).
372. See Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
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threat is analyzed under a "reasonable person in the same
circumstances" standard.373 Based on this rationale, a reasonable
person suspected of having knowledge of an impending terrorist
attack would likely consider the implied or explicit mention of truth
serum (such as, "we have ways of making you talk") as a threat. If
the implied threat of physical pain inflicts severe mental pain or
suffering, then the threat of truth serum will do the same.374
Moreover, the U.S. government must believe that the threat does
cause mental harm, or it would not include it in its understanding of
mental pain or suffering.375  In addition to the threatened
administration of drugs, the U.S. interpretation of mental harm
includes the threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering
and the threat of imminent death.376 It also includes a more attenuated
threat: "the threat that another person will be imminently subjected"
to death, severe pain or suffering, or the administration of mind
altering substances.377 If the threat of subjecting another person to
mind altering drugs is likely to cause mental harm, then it logically
follows that the threat of direct hostile administration of truth serum
would also yield mental harm.
An individual would likely suffer severe anguish at the thought of
being subjected to an effective truth serum due to fear of its
consequences: complete loss of control accompanied by coerced
betrayal of compatriots or cause.378 This anguish may actually
(holding Bosnian Serb police officer liable for several acts, including torture, cruel
and inhuman treatment, arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity under
international law, committed against Muslim Bosnian refugees); see also OLC
Memo, supra note 127, at 26 (analyzing the Court's finding of both physical and
mental torture based on the facts of Mehinovic v. Vuckovic).
373. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 9 (citing the reasonable person standard
as the common approach to assessing the existence of a threat of severe pain or
suffering).
374. See discussion supra note 305 and accompanying text (noting several acts
that imply threats that are generally recognized as inflicting severe mental pain or
suffering).
375. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (referring the threatened
administration of a mind altering drug as one possible cause of prolonged mental
harm).
376. See id. (listing possible causes of prolonged mental harm).
377. Id.
378. But cf Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 242 (claiming the nature of information
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increase due to the additional fear of the unknown. The subject might
believe that a conscious confession would give him some measure of
control, as opposed to a truth serum session where there might be no
limits on the type of secrets uncovered; who knows what kind of
personal questions the interrogators might ask, irrelevant to the
supposed purpose of preventive interrogation, just because they can?
Thus, the threatened administration of truth serum, much like the
actual use of truth serum, might well cause prolonged "severe pain or
suffering," such as anxiety, or even PTSD.
B. INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED FOR THE PURPOSE
By incorporating the use of mind altering drugs into the definition
of mental harm, the United States defines torture in such a way that
the use of truth serum can cause prolonged severe pain or
suffering.379 Nonetheless, this is not sufficient to prove torture under
CAT.380 Although truth serum can cause severe mental harm, the
harm is not intentionally inflicted for the purpose of obtaining
information (or any similar purpose); rather, the harm is merely a
side effect of the use of truth serum.381 Paradoxically, a lesser act-
the threat of application of truth serum-meets the intent
requirement because the threat causally and chronologically precedes
the fulfillment of the purpose. Thus, preventive interrogation
involving the use of truth serum satisfies severe mental pain or
sought is dispositive in determining whether use of truth serum is torture). Thus, it
might be argued that in interpreting mental harm, a value judgment should be made
regarding the mental anguish of the subject. Cf id. For example, the mental harm
of a law enforcement officer would be recognized, but the terrorist's mental trauma
from loss of control or betrayal of the cause should not be considered severe
mental pain because to do so would essentially condone a reprehensible belief
system. Cf id. But the mental anguish is not merely results-oriented; it is derived
from the utter helplessness and hostile mind control inherent in a truth serum
session. It can be recognized without legitimizing the terrorist's acts or aims, in the
same way that crime-fighting methods that shock the conscience are prohibited
without validating criminal behavior.
379. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2 (arguing the effects of truth serum session
are likely to satisfy requirement of prolonged severe mental harm).
380. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (stating "an act must be
specifically intended to inflict" severe pain or suffering).
381. See discussion supra Part I (explaining effective truth serum is not intended
to cause mental pain, but is simply meant to make it impossible for an individual to
provide false information).
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suffering, for the purpose of obtaining information by an official
(parts 1, 3, 4 of the definition of torture); but it is a split decision on
intentional infliction (part 2) because the use of truth serum does not
fulfill the intentional infliction requirement while the threatened use
of truth serum does.382
Preventive interrogational truth serum is an act inflicted for one of
the enumerated purposes (obtaining information or a confession)
under Article 1 of CAT.383 However, under the U.S. understanding to
Article 1, the act must also be one by which an interrogator
intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering for that purpose.384 U.S.
regulations related to the duty to refrain from sending one back to a
country where he is likely to face torture indicate that "an act that
results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain or suffering is
not torture." '385
Accidental pain would not constitute torture.386 There would be no
intent, for example, where an individual experiences pain during the
course of appropriate medical treatment, since such pain would not
have been intentionally inflicted in the sense of the definition of
torture.387 "On the contrary, such pain or suffering would be an
unintended side effect of the treatment. . . . A similar line of
reasoning may be applied to other situations where severe pain or
382. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 243-45 (breaking definition
of torture into four parts).
383. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (offering several examples of purposes for
which torture is used, including obtaining information or a confession,
intimidating, coercing, or punishing).
384. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at Understanding 1 (clarifying that in order
to constitute torture, an act must be made with the specific intention of causing
severe physical or mental pain or suffering).
385. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, ANNEX IV, INS
REGULATIONS ON TORTURE (2004) (establishing procedures for raising a claim for
protection from torture, and reiterating the fact that, to qualify as torture, an act
must be intended to cause severe pain or suffering), at
www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/tortureannex4.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
386. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 67, at 118 (concluding that where
pain or suffering is a result of an accident or mere negligence, the criteria required
for categorizing the act as "torture" are not met).
387. See id. at 119 (referring to "fully justified medical treatment").
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suffering would be caused by a deliberate act but where nonetheless
the element of 'intentional infliction' would be lacking. 388 The
administration of truth serum seems to be one of these situations.
1. Administration of Truth Serum
In cases involving the involuntary administration of truth serum,
the mental anguish caused is incidental to the actual use of the
serum. 389 This raises the question: does contemporaneous pain
constitute pain that is intentionally inflicted to obtain information?
The purpose of using truth serum is to obtain the truth, not cause
pain. But the same could be said of beatings or electric shock used to
obtain a confession. Although those physical acts precede the
"obtaining of the confession," the central purpose of them is to
induce speech, not pain. The pain is simply the means of obtaining
the information. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference
between the infliction of physical pain and the use of truth serum.
The pain of a physical beating is intended to fulfill the purpose-to
force a confession, for example. In using truth serum, the
interrogator would argue that no pain is intended; it is the truth
serum, not the mental pain, that is intended to fulfill the purpose of
obtaining information. In other words, truth serum fulfills the
purpose regardless of any resulting contemporaneous mental pain.
The intentional infliction requirement, according to the first OLC
Memo, means that the "precise objective" of the interrogator must be
the infliction of severe pain.3 90 Knowing that severe pain would
388. Id.
389. See discussion supra Part I (arguing the purpose of using truth serum is to
obtain truthful information, not to cause pain).
390. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 3 (noting 18 U.S.C. § 2340 requires
specific intent, and adding that, if the statute only required general intent, guilt
would be sufficiently established by showing the defendant possessed knowledge
that his actions were only reasonably likely to cause pain or suffering). The OLC
also initially argued that prosecutions for torture as part of the war on terror would
be unconstitutional or unlikely given the applicable justification defenses. See id.
at 36-39 (arguing the Department of Justice could not enforce 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
against federal officials acting pursuant to the President's constitutional
Commander-in-Chief authority to wage a military campaign); see also id. at 39-46
(providing the justification defenses of necessity and self-defense, which could
potentially eliminate criminal liability for certain interrogation methods). The
Revised OLC Memo has abandoned these arguments as unnecessary. See
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likely result from his actions would not be sufficient; this would
satisfy only general intent. "Thus, even if the defendant knows that
severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not
his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the
defendant did not act in good faith."3 91 As a practical matter, though,
knowing that severe pain or suffering is reasonably likely to result
might be adequate to prove specific intent because juries may be able
to infer it from the facts.3 92 "[W]hen a defendant knows that his
actions will produce the prohibited result, a jury will in all likelihood
conclude that the defendant acted with specific intent."3 93 On the
other hand, it is possible that an interrogator might decide (or
someone may advise him) that juries would be highly unlikely to
infer specific intent when dealing with preventive interrogational
truth serum. Armed with this knowledge, an interrogator might well
use truth serum, justifying its use on the ground that he had no
specific intent.
The Revised OLC Memo refers to the "precise objective" test and
states: "We do not reiterate that test here."3 94 The Revised OLC
Memo does not reject the test, but merely declines to define specific
intent.395 "In light of the President's directive that the United States
not engage in torture, it would not be appropriate to rely on parsing
the specific intent element of the statute to approve as lawful conduct
that might otherwise amount to torture. 396 It does, however, make
some "observations" with regard to a good faith defense.3 97
discussion supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing new position on
torture and Commander-in-Chief power).
391. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 4 (concluding a defendant is guilty of
torture only if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or
suffering on an individual within his custody or physical control).
392. See id. at 5 (pointing out that while a defendant's knowledge that severe
pain will result from his actions does not constitute specific intent if causing such
harm is not his objective, juries are permitted to infer from the factual
circumstances that such intent is nevertheless present).
393. Id. at 4 (describing the standard that a jury will use in deciding requisite
intent).
394. Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 16 n.27.
395. See id. at 16 ("We do not believe it is useful to try to define the precise
meaning of "specific intent .....
396. Id. at 16-17.
397. See id. at 17 (discussing situations when a defendant would not have
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The OLC initially contended that an interrogator could negate a
showing or inference of specific intent by arguing that he was
unaware of any mental harm of the type caused by truth serum.398 If
an interrogator does not believe that the sense of invasion,
helplessness, and loss of control causes prolonged mental harm, he
would have a strong argument that he did not specifically intend the
pain.3 99 The first OLC Memo thus stated that an interrogator could
show that he "acted in good faith by taking such steps as surveying
professional literature, consulting with experts, or reviewing
evidence gained from past experience."4 "0 The Revised OLC Memo
preserves this exception by stating that "if an individual acted in
good faith, and only after reasonable investigation establishing that
his conduct would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering, it appears unlikely that he would have the specific intent
necessary to violate sections 2340-2340A."4 °1 It is therefore possible
that government experts would provide material purporting to
establish that mental harm is not caused by truth serum sufficient to
establish that an interrogator would have a "good faith" defense.
Most significantly, under CAT the use of truth serum must be an
"act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted for" a certain purpose, such as obtaining
information.4 2 If no mental pain resulted from the use of truth serum,
the interrogator would still obtain the information. As a result, the
administration of truth serum is an act that causes mental pain or
suffering, but it is not an act by which pain is inflicted in order to
specific intent).
398. See OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 8 (explaining that if a defendant has a
good faith belief that his actions will not result in prolonged mental harm, he lacks
the mental state necessary for his actions to constitute torture).
399. See id. (arguing that because the statute requires that the defendant
specifically intend to cause severe mental harm, and because it expressly defines
severe mental pain in terms of prolonged mental harm, that mental state must be
present with respect to prolonged mental harm).
400. Id. at 8 (offering examples of steps that an interrogator may take to
demonstrate that he has examined a relevant body of knowledge concerning
prolonged mental harm and subsequently, and in good faith, determined that his
acts would not cause such harm).
401. Id. at 17.
402. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (emphasis added) (describing the factors
necessary for actions to be considered "torture" under CAT).
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obtain the information.4 3 The mental pain is a side effect of the act,
not causally related to intentionally fulfilling the purpose.4° The
official does not cause the anguish of self-betrayal or loss of control
in order to obtain information; it is simply incidental to the
administration of truth serum. Therefore, the use of truth serum does
not appear to be intentionally inflicted for the purpose of obtaining
information.
On the other hand, it is possible that a foreseeable by-product
might satisfy specific intent. According to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, specific intent necessary to prove that torture "is satisfied
if prolonged mental pain or suffering either is purposefully inflicted
or is the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate act."4 5 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in a case
recognizing that the immigration regulation regarding
nonrefoulement requires specific intent in order to prove torture.40 6
The court then took into account the interpretation of the regulation:
However, the regulation immediately explains: "[a]n act that results in
unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture."
The intent requirement therefore distinguishes between suffering that is
the accidental result of an intended act, and suffering that is purposefully
inflicted or the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate conduct.
However, this is not the same as requiring a specific intent to inflict
suffering.
40 7
403. See discussion supra Part I.B, note 51 and accompanying text (positing the
administration of the serum does not cause any physical pain beyond the prick of a
needle).
404. Cf. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
101st Cong. 100-20 (1990) (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice Criminal Division) (stating the definition of mental
pain does not encompass compelled testimony against a friend notwithstanding the
"incidental effect of producing mental strain").
405. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added) (construing federal immigration regulations prohibiting the return of alien
to a country where he would be likely subjected to torture); see also discussion
supra Part II.C (briefly discussing immigration regulations).
406. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (examining a
situation involving an alien requesting asylum in the United States due to fear that
she would be subject to torture if forced to return to her home country).
407. Id. (asserting the requirement of intentional infliction does not necessarily
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The mental anguish from a waking nightmare infliction of truth
serum seems to be a "foreseeable consequence" of preventive
interrogational truth serum; however, it appears that the Third Circuit
limited the "foreseeable consequence" rationale to threats. The court
continued its explanation of the requirement of specific intent:
[CAT] does not require that the persecutor actually intend to cause the
threatened result. It is sufficient if the persecutor causes severe
psychological suffering by threatening beatings for one of the specified
purposes.... The persecutor need not intend to "make good" on his/her
threats for the resulting suffering to constitute torture so long as the
threats are sufficiently protracted, and/or of such an egregious nature to
elevate the foreseeable suffering to the level of "torture.
'AO8
Because truth serum's mentally painful side effect is very different
from the mental pain caused by threatened torture, the "foreseeable
consequence" interpretation is most likely inapplicable, 40 9 and the
administration of truth serum fails to satisfy the specific intent
requirement.
2. Threatened Administration of Truth Serum
On the other hand, the threat of preventive interrogational truth
serum would meet the specific intent test. Unlike the actual use of
truth serum, the threat is an act by which an interrogator deliberately
inflicts pain in order to obtain information.410 Whether it is the pain
create a "specific intent" requirement). Rather, the court maintains that the
language of CAT was simply meant to exclude severe pain or suffering "that is an
unintended consequence of an intentional act." Id.
408. Id. (adding if courts were to require aliens to establish specific intent of his
or her persecutors, this could impose huge obstacles to affording the protections
which the community of nations, through CAT, sought to guarantee).
409. But see Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at 17 (stating some
"observations" regarding specific intent). The Revised OLC Memo might re-open
the door seemingly shut in the courts regarding foreseeability. The new discussion
states that an individual would not have specific intent where he did not desire the
result nor have "'knowledge or notice' that his act 'would likely have resulted in'
the prescribed outcome.... "' Id. Under this reasoning, an interrogator might have
specific intent where he knew severe mental pain or suffering was likely. Id. The
good faith defense, however, along with potential jury nullification would still
apply. See discussion supra notes 391-401 and accompanying text (discussing
likelihood of jury inferring specific intent in terrorism context and good faith
defense).
410. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.c (recognizing the threatened
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of intense anxiety or the pain of anticipated mind invasion, the pain
itself is the main objective-without it, the interrogator will not
achieve his purpose. The whole point of the threat of forcible
administration of truth serum is to cause such anxiety that the subject
divulges the information.41" ' One cannot argue that pain is merely
incidental, because the pain is the only way to make the threat an
effective one. Mental suffering is inarguably the "precise objective"
when that is the exact nature of making a threat.41 2 The "foreseeable
consequence" of threatening to administer truth serum is severe
mental anguish-if it were not, there would be no point in making
the threat. Thus, the threatened administration of truth serum likely
satisfies the requirement of intentional infliction and therefore the
definition of torture under CAT as ratified and understood by the
United States.413
As a result of the intentional infliction requirement, there is a
loophole in CAT. The definition presumes that the mental pain
precedes the achievement of the stated purpose, i.e., the pain causes
the subject to surrender information.414 But with the administration of
truth serum, the substance causes the subject to speak-the mental
anguish is an incidental side effect, which thereby renders the act
insufficient to constitute torture. By contrast, the intent behind
threatening to use truth serum is to cause such pain or suffering that
the subject will divulge the information without the need to actually
use the serum. 4 15 Thus, the threat of using truth serum is torture,
administration of truth serum is an act that can have the effect of causing pain or
suffering).
411. See id. (explaining when faced with the choice between a conscious
confession and one induced by truth serum, a subject is likely to prefer a conscious
confession, during which he will at least exercise some measure of control.)
412. See discussion supra notes 390-397 and accompanying text (discussing the
OLC Memo requirement of "precise objective" and Revised OLC Memo refusal to
reiterate the requirement). Compare OLC Memo, supra note 127, at 3 (contending
intentional infliction requires that interrogator have the precise objective of
inflicting severe pain or suffering), with Revised OLC Memo, supra note 156, at
16 n.27 (declining to reiterate the precise objective test).
413. See discussion supra Parts II.B-D (outlining the U.S. definition and
interpretation of what constitutes "torture").
414. See CAT, supra note 30, art. 1 (providing the various requirements of
"torture").
415. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.c (detailing the implications and effects
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while its actual use is not. This perverse outcome cannot be what the
drafters intended when creating CAT or what the United States
sought to accomplish in ratifying it.
416
V. A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF TORTURE
If the conclusion is that the threat of using preventive
interrogational truth serum is torture, but its actual use is not, then
there are two options. First, accept that the use of truth serum is not
prohibited; or second, adopt a new understanding of torture. The
second option is preferable.
The first alternative is unpalatable for several reasons. First, the
U.S. belief in human autonomy, free will, and individuality should
make us profoundly uncomfortable about the invasion of the mind
entailed by the hostile interrogational use of truth serum. The
suspected terrorist has the same interest in free will as any other
human being and would suffer mental pain from having that will
overborne by truth serum, just as the FBI agent who involuntarily
aids Al Qaeda would suffer. Even the U.S. intelligence community
recognizes the importance of free will, referring to the "general
abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents 'to
make people do things against their will .. .'417 Similarly, "It was
always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic American principle
of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated.
418
The basis for the ban on truth serum, like torture in general, should
rest on the principle that individuals should honor the mental
integrity of others, "as democracy is based upon respect for such a
security. ' 4 19 Truth serum diminishes the person to a mere object from
regarding the threatened administration of mind altering drugs).
416. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing CAT as codifying customary
international law ban on torture); see also U.S. RUDs, supra note 81, at
Understanding l(a) (providing the use or threatened use of mind altering drugs
calculated to profoundly disrupt the mind or personality can cause severe mental
pain or suffering and therefore constitute torture).
417. Joint Hearing, supra note 28, at 28 (commenting that this "general
abhorrence" is a major reason why there has not been an openly published
systematic study concerning the potentiality of using drugs for interrogation).
418. Id. at 96.
419. Jonathan Grebinar, Comment, Responding to Terrorism: How Must a
Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and American Law, 31 FORDHAM URB.
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which information is extracted, while forcing her to act contrary to
her beliefs and judgment.4 10 A ban on truth serum would uphold both
mental and bodily integrity, creating the kind of society in which
people would wish to live.421
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes an interest in the bodily
integrity of individuals.422 Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dep 't of Health explained that "[b]ecause our
notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the
Due Process Clause. '423 Further, the idea that the mental integrity of
an individual should be accorded equal respect and protection was
advanced by Justice Kennedy, who "recently set forth the
constitutional importance of the 'autonomy of self. ... "',424 "Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes the freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. '425 Indeed, "Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
L. J. 261, 271 (2003) (discussing physical and mental integrity as reasons for a ban
on torture).
420. See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism
and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1492 (2004) (proposing an
absolute prohibition of torture based on moral absolutism).
421. See id. at 1504 (acknowledging that although an absolute ban on torture
may seem unrealistic as a practical matter, there is nevertheless independent
societal value in upholding the myth that an absolute ban exists).
422. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (holding the
Constitution guarantees respect for personal immunities since they are so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be fundamental); see also
Kreimer, supra note 213, at 289 (citing Rochin "as a keystone in the constitutional
protection of bodily integrity against arbitrary invasion").
423. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying how the state's imposition
of medical treatment on an unwilling competent adult inevitably involves some
form of restraint and intrusion and thus may burden that individual's liberty
interests just as much as state coercion).
424. Kreimer, supra note 213, at 298 (highlighting how this idea from Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003), emphasizes the importance of autonomy
within liberty).
425. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (finding unconstitutional a
Texas statute that criminalized intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the
same sex).
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government the power to control men's minds. 426 An effective truth
serum induces "the subject to abandon her own volition and become
the instrument of the torturer by revealing information. Such
government occupation of the self is at odds with constitutional
mandate. 427
The cases allowing forced medication of incompetent criminal
defendants are distinguishable from the hostile use of truth serum.
Involuntary administration of medication is proper only upon a
finding that it is in the interest of both the state and the individual.428
In Sell v. United States,429 for example, the Supreme Court held that
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a
mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial is justified only if it is
the least intrusive alternative to significantly further an important
government interest, and it is medically appropriate, i.e., in the
patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition.43 ° An
individual who refuses to divulge information is not suffering from a
medical condition, and the forced administration of truth serum
cannot be deemed to be in the interest of the subject's health. Thus,
preventive interrogational truth serum should be prohibited in order
to uphold the mental integrity, free will, and autonomy of every
individual.43'
426. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit states from criminalizing the mere private
possession of obscene material).
427. Kreimer, supra note 213, at 299 (noting the effects of torture contradict
American conceptions of liberty and due process).
428. See id. at 299 n.75 (describing the degree to which the administrator of
medicine on a patient against her will must be sure that all parties involved will
benefit).
429. See 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (establishing that the government can administer
antipsychotic drugs without consent in order to render mentally ill defendant
competent to face serious criminal charges where treatment is medically
appropriate, necessary and unlikely to significantly undermine a fair trial).
430. See id. at 180-81 (establishing a rule for the future that when the state
involuntarily administers antipsychotic drugs, it must be done only as a last resort
and only after meeting a high burden of necessity under the circumstances
including the best medical interests of the subject).
431. See Kreimer, supra note 213, at 298 (affirming the idea that individual
autonomy is of the utmost importance).
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Second, there is the problem of the slippery slope-after terrorists,
who will be next? According to Nigel S. Rodley, U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Torture, "once torture is permitted on grounds of
necessity, nothing can stop it from being used on grounds of
expediency. 43 2 The use of preventive interrogational truth serum
would inevitably creep into other areas.433 After suspected terrorists,
will the government torture all suspected narcotics traffickers,
dealers, or users in the name of the war on drugs? Will the
government torture all suspected criminals, juvenile delinquents, or
ex-cons in the wholesale war on crime? Will the state subject all who
want to join the military to truth serum in order to weed out
"practicing" homosexuals, bisexuals, or even those with homosexual
"tendencies"?
These possibilities are not as far down the slippery slope as they
might appear at first glance. In testimony before the U.S. Senate,
Attorney General John Ashcroft implied that anyone who disagreed
with the Bush Administration's anti-terrorism tactics was supporting
the enemy, i.e., committing treason.434 His comments addressed
"fear-mongers" 435 who expressed concern that these tactics erode
constitutional rights and liberties: "To those who scare peace-loving
people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your
tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to ...enemies and
pause to . . . friends." '436 A Bush appointee to the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights indicated that another terrorist attack would lead to
432. RODLEY, supra note 66, at 80 (accentuating how torture will become the
norm once it is can be established that it is an effective tool to obtain information).
433. See id. at 80-81 (showing how the incorporation of justifiability of torture
would cut against every formulation of the prohibition against torture).
434. See Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Anti-Terrorism Steps, WASH. POST, Dec.
7, 2001, at Al (reporting on the extent to which officials in the Bush
Administration went in order to defend their anti-terrorism policies).
435. See id. (expressing Ashcroft's outrage at unidentified critics for
"exaggerating or mischaracterizing administration policies," and contention that
the Justice Department "has sought to prevent terrorism with reason, careful
balance and excruciating attention to detail").
436. See id. (responding to critiques from the Judiciary Committee on the Bush
Administration's handling of the war on terror).
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internment camps for anyone of the same ethnicity as the terrorists,437
much like the reprehensible Japanese American internment camps of
World War II. He later clarified that while the Bush Administration
was not considering internment camps, another terrorist attack would
give rise to a groundswell of public opinion to banish civil rights by
those who fear for their safety.438
Branding critics as traitors and raising the specter of internment
camps is only a step, not a leap, from interrogating suspected traitors
or criminals with the aid of truth serum. As the use of "moderate
physical pressure"439 in Israel" has shown, it is impossible to limit
the use of torture once it is condoned on even the smallest scale. In
Israel, interrogation tactics initially limited to subjects thought to
have information about imminent attacks were eventually used
against virtually every Palestinian security detainee, numbering in
the thousands." Like the fictional futurist world where "thought
437. See Robert E. Pierre, Fear and Anxiety Permeate Arab Enclave Near
Detroit, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2002, at A3 (predicting the extreme measures that
the administration will be forced to resort to in the event of another major terrorist
attack).
438. Id.
439. Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods of Sept. 6, 1999, Motion for an Order
Nisi, H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) (holding "moderate
physical pressure" such as shaking, painful positions and sleep deprivation could
no longer be used by the General Security Service even to thwart crimes against
state security and that there was no necessity defense absent future legislation).
440. See, e.g., MALCOLM D. EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A
STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 26-61 (1998) (covering
Algeria, Northern Ireland, and Israel). Israel is not, of course, the only state to use
torture; nor is it the worst offender. It is one of a few states considered a modem
democracy that have admitted to the use of practices that might constitute torture.
Great Britain's actions in Northern Ireland and France's actions in Algeria are two
other often-cited examples of democracies using questionable tactics to suppress
terrorist groups. Id. Many other authoritarian states, by contrast, use similar or
more extreme methods--often indiscriminately-but do not admit such use. See,
e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. STATE DEP'T,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2003 (2004), at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (annual
reports criticizing human rights abuses in other countries, including torture).
441. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LEGAL PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE
(2004) (discussing how narrowly-authorized Israeli tactics spread to routine
interrogations), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/TortureQandA.htm (last
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police" arrest those scientifically determined to be prone to violence,
the expansion of potential truth serum subjects negates the potential
for change, improvement, and progress that is central to the
American dream." 2
Third, the use of torture by the United States lowers our standing
in the world and makes it far more difficult to obtain the kind of
international cooperation necessary to root out terrorists," 3 as
illustrated by the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, a strong proponent of the U.S.-led invasion
of Iraq, conceded that the Abu Ghraib scandal has significantly
harmed U.S. diplomacy, telling the House Armed Services
Committee, "The damage is enormous." 44 Similarly, Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales, former White House Counsel,
admitted that the abuse at Abu Ghraib had "hurt the United States
badly in its standing in the world." 445 By using interrogational truth
serum on those we consider terrorists, the United States would be
giving the green light to other countries to use similar means against
those they consider terrorists."6 Even if the United States was not
concerned about the treatment of other nationals by their own states,
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
442. See Marie Ewald, Can the Thought Police be Far Behind?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 15, 2003 (explaining the origin of the reference in popular culture
to thought police, and its impact on how the world thinks about government
control of the people), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0515/p14s02-
stgn.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
443. See Lichtblau, supra note 16 (quoting Republican Senator Lindsey
Graham's allegation that the Bush Administration's legal position on torture
"'dramatically undermined the campaign against terrorism by yielding the moral
highground"').
444. Colum Lynch, U.S. Alters Its Plan for Exemption At Court, WASH. POST,
June 23, 2004, at A13 (outlining how the U.S. dropped its plan for open-ended
exemptions for U.S. peacekeepers from the International Criminal Court, due to
worldwide outrage over the photos of abusive tactics used by U.S. personnel at
Abu Ghraib).
445. Lichtblau, supra note 16 (stating, nonetheless, CIA officers and other
nonmilitary personnel fall outside the bounds of a 2002 directive issued by
President Bush pledging humane treatment of prisoners in American custody and
that a Congressional ban on cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment has "a limited
reach" and does not apply in all cases to "aliens overseas").
446. See Lynch, supra note 444 (predicting the consequences of such careless
and detrimental policies by the United States).
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American self-interest promotes a ban on truth serum.447 In many
countries, the terrorist label would include U.S. citizens.
In addition, Americans might well be targeted for reciprocal
torture if the United States uses truth serum on citizens of other
countries. A similar consequence is seen in the aftermath of the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal." 8 In June 2004, Islamist militants abducted
Paul M. Johnson, an American working in Saudi Arabia, in order to
inflict the same torture as that inflicted by U.S. soldiers on Iraqi
detainees." 9 His captors subsequently beheaded Johnson in a
gruesome video distributed worldwide. 5 °
Fourth, various international documents support a ban on truth
serum. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment45 provides that all
detainees "shall be treated in a humane manner with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.'"452 Furthermore, "No detained
person while being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats
or methods of interrogation which impair his capacity of decision or
his judgment.' ' 453  The necessary participation of medical
447. See Odeshoo, supra note 27, at 255 (suggesting United States may opt to
ban truth serum in order to quiet international community's concerns about U.S.
tactics in the war on terror).
448. See Craig Whitlock, Islamic Militants Behead American in Saudi Arabia,
WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at A6 (illustrating the harsh ramifications that can be
inflicted on Americans in response to the continued use of torture on prisoners
from around the globe).
449. See Donna Abu-Nasr, Captors Threaten to Abuse Kidnapped American
Man, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 14, 2004, at A3 (noting how photos of torture
and other abuse at Abu Ghraib show a female U.S. soldier dragging a naked
prisoner by a leash, a naked prisoner being menaced with dogs, and forced
simulations of sex acts among prisoners, all while allegations of murder and rape
are being investigated at various U.S. detention facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
450. See Whitlock, supra note 448 (describing how Johnson's decapitated
remains were found on the outskirts of Riyadh, prior to those responsible claiming
that he got his fair treatment).
451. See G.A. Res. 43/173, Annex, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 298, U.N.
Doc. A/43/49 (1988) (pertaining to all persons deprived of personal liberty).
452. Id. at Principle 1.
453. Id. at Principle 21 (emphasis added) (pertaining specifically to pre-
conviction detainees; prohibiting also acts that take advantage of persons to
compel self-incrimination, whether pre- or post-conviction).
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professionals in developing or safely administering a drug like truth
serum implicates the Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the
Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection
of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.454
It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offence under
applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly
physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute
participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.4
55
Moreover, "It is a contravention of medical ethics for health
personnel, particularly physicians: (a) to apply their knowledge and
skills in order to assist in the interrogation of prisoners and detainees
in a manner that may adversely affect the physical or mental health
or condition of such prisoners or detainees .... "456
In addition, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture ("Inter-American Torture Convention") provides a definition
of torture that explicitly prohibits the use of truth serum.457 The Inter-
454. See G.A. Res. 37/194, Annex, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 211, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1982) (illustrating the extent to which the world community bans
torture by the inclusion of a provision against torture in the medical ethics of
physicians).
455. Id. at Principle 2.
456. Id. at Principle 4.
457. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at Annex 2b (placing the use of truth serum
within the definition of torture). Although the U.S. has not signed or ratified this
treaty, as a member of the Organization of American States it is bound by the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota (1984). See
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10, 45, 47 (1989)
(finding that the American Declaration is a source of binding international
obligations for OAS members), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serieapdf ing/seriea 10_ing.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2005); see also Case 9647, Inter-Amer. C.H.R. 147, 159 OEA/Ser. L?V?11.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (Roach & Pinkerton) (reviewing petition against United States
despite its protests that the American Declaration is a nonbinding document). The
Inter-American Torture Convention arguably provides guidance for the
interpretation of American Declaration rights to security of person (Article 1) and
humane treatment when in custody (Article XXV) and thus applies to the United
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American Torture Convention, drafted at the same time as CAT, was
adopted on December 9, 1985.458 It provides in pertinent part:
"Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a
person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to
diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause
physical pain or mental anguish. ' 45 9 This definition targets not only
anxiety-inducing sensory deprivation techniques, but also mind
control via chemicals.46°
Fifth, coupled with the conclusion regarding the threat of truth
serum, the exemption for the use of truth serum is illogical. It simply
makes no sense to consider the threat of truth serum to be torture
while allowing its actual use. This creates the perverse incentive to
go straight to the use of truth serum. In order to avoid committing
torture, an interrogator would carefully refrain from any mention of
truth serum in order to avoid any indication of a threat; perhaps he
would even promise that it would not be used, up until the moment
the mysterious substance being injected into the subject takes effect.
This cannot be a correct reading of CAT.
Finally, excluding interrogational truth serum is discriminatory, or
at least gives the appearance of being discriminatory. A definition of
torture that does not cover an interrogation technique that causes pain
and simultaneously fulfills the purpose (e.g., obtaining information)
creates a loophole for only the most technologically advanced
countries. Those states with the most resources and technology can
develop advanced drugs to elicit information against the will of
detainees-and use truth serum without the stigma of committing
torture. In other words, advanced states will get away with
profoundly disturbing acts by virtue of technical prowess, while less
developed states are condemned for committing torture. Of course,
ideally, the less technologically advanced states would stop torturous
interrogations; but this is even less likely to occur when wealthy
States.
458. See RODLEY, supra note 66, at 51 (providing a broader definition of torture
than CAT's definition).
459. Id. at 51 (quoting Article 2).
460. See id. at 100 (attacking the notion that torture is merely a physical and
pain-driven method of gaining information).
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nations are flaunting the nonprohibited use of truth serum.461 The
loophole for the ultra-advanced truth serum "play[s] into the hands of
those governments of developing countries that consider the issue of
torture to be a discriminatory one. That is, that accusations of torture
made by developed countries which have devised more refined
techniques to achieve the same purposes are hypocritically leveled at
countries less technologically advanced. '462
CONCLUSION
Thus, we are left with option number two-develop a new
understanding of torture. Torture should encompass the profound
mental harm caused by truth serum whether the harm precedes or
exists simultaneously with the purpose of coercing divulgence of
information.4 63 Even when faced with the challenges of combating
global terrorist groups, democratic states cannot resort to torture.
"This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to
it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it.
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. ' '464 Particularly at a time
when the United States is suffering at home and abroad from the
torture scandals of Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, it is critical that the
United States take a firm and unequivocal stand against the forced
administration of truth serum.
461. Cf RODLEY, supra note 66, at 93 n.94 (citing press account of Shah of
Iran's statement that Iran should adopt the same methods of torture as Europeans).
462. Id. at 93.
463. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON INT'L
HUMAN RIGHTS, COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED STATES' INTERROGATION OF
DETAINEES 71 (referring to State Department report on Burma criticizing it for
committing "torture" or "other abuse" by using "interrogation techniques designed
to intimidate or disorient."), at http://www.abcny.org/homepg.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005). The same standard ought to apply to U.S. interrogation techniques
and therefore prohibit tactics designed to disorient, such as truth serum. Id.
464. Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods of Sept. 6, 1999, Motion for an Order
Nisi, H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) (finding "moderate
physical pressure" on security detainees unauthorized and rejecting necessity
defense).
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